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1 Introduction
Work is an essential part of daily life. The individual work performance depends 
on various factors, such as a worker’s experience and job match quality. In case 
of unemployment, the individual job search intensity is basically determined by a 
worker’s income expectations and opportunity costs. Hence, individual job finding 
and separation probabilities may differ substantially.
From a macroeconomic perspective, worker flows and the underlying transition 
rates are strongly influenced by the economic situation. In booms, firms post more 
vacancies and the job finding probability rises. In recessions, firms reduce their 
labor demand and workers are more likely to lose their job. From a political point of 
view, these fluctuations are challenging. They are desirable as they ensure a flexible 
adjustment of firms to new circumstances, but they are also undesirable as they 
cause uncertainty for workers.
In practice, labor market fluctuations appear to be large. The empirical evidence 
on unemployment dynamics has also led to some caveats on the search and matching 
model – the workhorse in modern macroeconomic labor market research. Shimer 
(2005) shows that the baseline version of the search and matching model fails to 
replicate the observed fluctuations in the U.S. labor market. The so-called Shimer 
puzzle has triggered a rich discussion on the standard model, from both a theoretical 
and an empirical point of view. The attempts to overcome the quantitative shortcoming 
have subsided nowadays, but a reconsideration of the model setup remains.
This dissertation addresses different issues on the cyclicality of worker flows 
in three self-contained essays. The issues include (i) the cyclical behavior of the 
job finding and separation rates, (ii) the role of productivity shocks in explaining 
labor market fluctuations and (iii) the matching function as modeling device for 
labor market frictions. These issues are crucial for macroeconomic outcomes and 
are interesting topics by themselves. For example, the argument of a cyclical 
time aggregation bias in the measurement of worker flows has initiated a new 
assessment of variations in the separation rate. In addition, recent evidence on 
the Schumpeterian paradigm has challenged the traditional view of decreasing 
unemployment after a positive productivity shock. Finally, the matching function 
has obtained a novel role in evaluating the aggregate effects of labor market 
reforms, though it still lacks on a microfoundation.
The following essays analyze the aforementioned issues for the German economy. 
They take advantage of process-generated data from the Federal Employment 
Agency (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) and shed new light on recent discussions on 
worker flows. They contribute to the literature on labor market fluctuations and 
derive interesting questions for future research.
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The dissertation is structured as follows. The introduction chapter proceeds with 
a review of background topics and provides an overview of the three essays. The 
essays follow in Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 5 concludes with final remarks.
1.1 Background
1.1.1 The Search and Matching Model
The search and matching model has become the standard approach to represent 
the dynamics in the labor market. Based on the seminal contributions of Peter 
Diamond, Dale Mortensen and Christopher Pissarides, the model considers that the 
search and matching process is costly and time-consuming. Therefore, it is able 
to explain the coexistence of vacancies and (involuntary) unemployment as an 
equilibrium phenomenon (see, e.g., Pissarides, 2000).
A central building block of the search and matching model is the matching 
function. The matching function summarizes labor market frictions in a single 
relation and gives the number of job matches (M ) as a function of the stocks of 
unemployment (U ) and vacancies (V ): 
M = M(U, V),  (1.1)
where M(·) is increasing and concave in both its arguments and satisfies 
M(0, V )  = M(U, 0)  = 0 as well as M(U, V )  = min(U, V ). The standard assumption is 
that the matching function has constant returns to scale, which implies that each 
unemployed worker finds a job with probability M(U, V )/U and each vacancy is 
filled with probability M(U, V )/V.
The search and matching model provides an useful approach to integrate labor 
market frictions into a more general macroeconomic framework. In its baseline 
version, the search and matching model assumes the following steps after an 
aggregate productivity shock: 
 • Firms reassess the expected profits from a job. 
 • Vacancies are posted according to a free entry condition. 
 • Unemployed workers apply for vacant positions. 
 • Firms and applicants meet via the matching function. 
 • Firm-worker pairs negotiate about the wage. 
 • Employed workers produce an output, while unemployed workers receive an 
unemployment income. 
 • Some of the existing jobs are destroyed and affected workers separate into 
unemployment. 
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The changes in unemployment then feed back through the matching function and, 
subsequently, the labor market returns to equilibrium. 
Moreover, the brief outline shows that the search and matching model is an 
attractive starting point for many applications. In particular, the analysis of labor 
market policies has received much attention, because specific institutions, such as 
employment protection or the unemployment insurance system, can be directly 
linked to the model’s components.
1.1.2 The Shimer Puzzle
Shimer (2005) argues that the standard search and matching model cannot explain 
the cyclical behavior of unemployment and vacancies. The author analyzes the 
fluctuations in the U.S. labor market and compares them with the prediction of the 
search and matching model by simulating a productivity shock that fits the data 
on productivity. The separation rate is assumed to be exogenous as in the standard 
textbook model (see Pissarides, 2000, Chapter 1). Table 1.1 presents the summary 
statistics of the empirical and simulated data.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics for U.S. data
U V V/U f s a
Standard deviation 0.190 0.202 0.382 0.118 0.075 0.020 
[0.009] [0.027] [0.035] [0.010] [ – ] [0.020] 
Autocorrelation 0.936 0.940 0.941 0.908 0.733 0.878 
[0.939] [0.835] [0.878] [0.878] [ – ] [0.878] 
Correlation U 1 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949 0.709 -0.408 
matrix [1] [-0.927] [-0.958] [-0.958] [ – ] [-0.958] 
V 1 0.975 0.897 -0.684 0.364 
[1] [0.996] [0.996] [ – ] [0.995] 
V/U 1 0.948 -0.715 0.396 
[1] [1.000] [ – ] [0.999] 
f 1 -0.574 0.396 
[1] [ – ] [0.999] 
s 1 -0.524 
[1] [ – ] 
a 1 
[1] 
Source:  Shimer (2005), Tables 1 and 3. Quarterly U.S. data from 1951 to 2003. Data on unemployment (U ), 
vacancies (V ), the job finding rate (f ) and the separation rate (s ) are quarterly averages of monthly series. 
Values in brackets are obtained from a simulation with a productivity (a) shock. Cyclical components are 
computed as log deviations from an Hodrick-Prescott trend with smoothing parameter λ = 105.
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The comparison of the standard deviations shows that the cyclical components 
of the labor market data are much larger than the corresponding fluctuations 
generated by the model simulation. Unemployment and vacancies deviate from 
their trend by approximately 20% in the data, while the search and matching model 
predicts a volatility of only 1% and 3%, respectively. Due to an opposite cyclicality 
of unemployment and vacancies the observed volatility of labor market tightness, 
i.e. the ratio of vacancies to unemployment, even amounts to 38%; however, the 
model suggests a standard deviation of 4%. The job finding rate fluctuates by 
12% in the data, whereas the model simulation yields a volatility of only 1%. The 
observed business cycle component of the separation rate varies by 8%; thus, it is 
less volatile than the business cycle component of the job finding rate.
The autocorrelation coefficients demonstrate a high persistence of labor market 
fluctuations, though the separation rate appears to adjust less gradually than the 
other variables. The search and matching model can generate the persistent features 
of the variables, but it seems to be unsatisfying with respect to vacancies. Moreover, 
the model is able to replicate the sign of the correlations between the different 
variables, most importantly the negative relationship between unemployment and 
vacancies (i.e. the Beveridge curve). However, the magnitude of the correlations is 
mostly overestimated. Particularly the predictions of the relations with productivity 
appear to be too large. This observation indeed points out that the standard model 
lacks on a mechanism that propagates the aggregate productivity shock and 
amplifies the labor market responses.
Cardullo (2010) surveys the literature that aims to solve the Shimer puzzle. The 
author distinguishes three avenues, namely changes in wage formation, changes in 
the calibration and changes in the model specification. Cardullo (2010) concludes 
that extensions of the baseline model, such as an endogenization of the separation 
rate or the incorporation of turnover costs, seem to achieve the most effective 
results.
1.1.3 Ongoing Debates on Worker Flows
The role of the job finding and separation margins in understanding labor market 
fluctuations has been widely discussed over years. Early studies relate recessions to 
large waves of job separations along with job destruction, because job destruction 
is observed to respond more sensitively to business cycle shocks than job 
creation (see, e.g., Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Blanchard and Diamond, 1990). 
Accordingly, Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) consider countercyclical variations 
of job destruction in the search and matching model by allowing for idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks.
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The conventional view of a separation-driven labor adjustment has been challenged 
by two studies. Hall (2005) demonstrates that the U.S. separation rate is nearly 
constant over the past 50 years, while the job finding rate exhibits a high volatility 
on business cycle frequency. Shimer (2005; 2012) advocates a dominant role of 
the job finding rate by accounting for a procyclical time aggregation bias in the 
separation rate. Hence, the new evidence on labor market dynamics appears to 
result from churning effects (i.e. the difference between job and worker flows at 
the firm level) as well as a careful measurement of worker flows.
However, there are several arguments that counter a focus on the job finding 
margin (see, e.g. Davis, 2005; Kennan, 2005; Fujita and Ramey, 2006). In particular, 
more recent studies apply a variance decomposition of unemployment fluctuations 
and demonstrate a substantial impact of the separation rate (see Fujita and Ramey, 
2009; Elsby et al., 2009b). In European countries the contributions of the job finding 
and separation rates even tend to be closer (see Elsby et al., 2009a).
Moreover, emphasizing either adjustment margin has important implications for 
the theoretical paradigm underlying a productivity shock. The separation-driven view 
has motivated Schumpeterian arguments of creative destruction (see, e.g. Caballero 
and Hammour, 1994), while the job finding-driven view has been underpinned by 
the Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory (see, e.g., Merz, 1995; Andolfatto, 1996). After 
a positive impulse, RBC models feature a fall in unemployment due to higher labor 
demand. In contrast to that, the Schumpeterian paradigm implies a (temporary) 
rise in unemployment following a positive productivity shock. This mechanism is 
actually revived by recent research that is based on structural vectorautoregressive 
(SVAR) estimations (see Canova et al., forthcoming). At the same time, there is 
some evidence that productivity shocks have ambiguous effects on the job finding 
margin, which can be explained by skill-biased technological change (see Balleer, 
2012). 
In the standard search and matching model, the job finding margin is formalized 
by a matching function. The matching function captures the impact of labor market 
frictions without modeling them explicitly. Frictions in the labor market may derive 
from different reasons: imperfect information, heterogeneities, mobility costs, 
congestion or other factors (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The matching 
function accounts for those frictions in a single relation with a small number of 
variables. However, the success of the matching function rather relies on its simple 
specification than on a convincing microfoundation.
So far, the literature provides some models that represent special types of labor 
market frictions. For example, the prominent urn-ball model derived from the study 
of Butters (1977) focuses on coordination failures of unemployed workers (“balls”) 
when applying for jobs (“urns”). Due to information deficits about other workers’ 
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behavior some workers may apply for the same job and some jobs may end up 
with no applications. Ranking models, like that of Blanchard and Diamond (1994), 
assume that firms have preferences over job applicants in terms of their skills 
or unemployment duration and thus offer their jobs to the workers ranked first. 
Another approach is given by stock-flow matching (see Coles and Smith, 1998), 
where job seekers can remain unmatched because of unsuitable jobs among the 
existing vacancies and vice versa. The unmatched job seekers and vacancies then 
have to wait for new entries to find a suitable match.
The existing approaches of specific labor market frictions give some intuition 
about the underlying mechanisms of the aggregate matching function, but they are 
not seen to make the reduced-form specification obsolete (see Pissarides, 2008). 
In contrast, the empirical support in favor of an aggregate matching function still 
convinces many economists to rely on its simple form.
1.1.4 Definition of Unemployment
The definition of labor market states plays a crucial role for the measurement 
of worker flows. In particular, the definition of unemployment is a challenging 
issue across countries. Given the heterogeneity of nonemployed people, most 
OECD countries use information on job search activities to distinguish between 
unemployment and the out of labor force (see Jones and Riddell, 1999).
Figure 1.1 illustrates the classification of nonemployment along the conventional 
“job search” criterion. Thereby, the unemployment status comprises people using 
both active and passive job search methods. Active job search includes, for example, 
the registration at public employment agencies, contacting of employers or placing 
job advertisements. In contrast, looking at advertisements is regarded as passive 
job search. 
The out of labor force is typically divided in terms of labor market attachment. 
Non-attachment may refer to students, retirees or non-employable persons. 
Marginally attached workers desire work and can be further distinguished with 
respect to their availability for a job. Workers characterized by the waiting status 
do not search because of awaiting a recall to a former job, waiting for replies from 
employers or waiting for a new job starting in the near future. Workers referred to 
as non-waiting do not search because of being discouraged, i.e. they believe that 
no suitable job is available, or due to personal reasons.
The diversity of the out of labor force has given rise to questions on the adequacy 
of the conventional “job search” criterion to measure unemployment, because it 
affects not only the level of unemployment but also the duration of unemployment 
periods. Jones and Riddell (1999) merge two Canadian survey data sets and analyze 
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the different subcategories of nonemployment. The results indicate that the “desire 
for work” criterion provides important information about future employment and 
therefore should supplement the conventional “job search” criterion. Moreover, the 
authors identify the waiting group to be misclassified as a part of the out of labor 
force, because it behaves more closely to unemployment or even employment.
The following essays take an alternative stand of the definition of unemployment. 
They rely on administrative data of actual labor market processes and use 
information on unemployment benefit receipt to approximate the unemployment 
pool. Thereby, the applied unemployment definition is assumed to combine the 
aforementioned criteria, because it considers both unemployment periods with 
benefit receipt and unemployment periods without benefit receipt.
1.2 Overview of the Essays
1.2.1 The Time Aggregation Bias in Worker Flows
The first essay analyzes the effects of time aggregation in the measurement of 
worker flows. Time aggregation, i.e. the observation of data processes at a lower 
frequency than they actually evolve, causes an underestimation of flow variables, 
because it neglects transitions that are reversed within two measurement points.
In the context of worker flows, Shimer (2005) argues that time aggregation 
primarily affects the separation rate, because unemployment periods are on 
average shorter than employment periods. The essay addresses Shimer’s argument 
Figure 1.1: Heterogeneity of nonemployment
Note: Classification of nonemployment according to the “job search” criterion (see Jones and Riddell, 1999).
Nonemployment
Unemployment Out of the labor force
Active  
job search
Marginal  
attachment
Passive  
job search
Non- 
attachment
Waiting
Non- 
waiting
Discouragement Other
(personal reasons, …)
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by exploiting daily information from German administrative data on individual 
labor market biographies. For this purpose, it introduces an unemployment measure 
that overcomes missing unemployment periods in the administrative database (so-
called nonemployment proxy).
The study derives a monthly measure of the time aggregation bias in the 
job finding and separation rates. It examines the bias in terms of its level and 
cyclicality and compares it with the prediction of a theoretical approach that aims 
to correct for time aggregation. Moreover, the study investigates the cyclicality 
of the job finding and separation rates by considering the dynamics of the time 
aggregation bias. In this context, the study gives particular attention to the low 
transition rates in the German labor market, because it suggests an unconventional 
variance decomposition of unemployment fluctuations.
An earlier version of this study is available as IAB Discussion Paper (see 
Nordmeier, 2012).
1.2.2 Unemployment Dynamics Conditional on Shocks
The second essay studies the dynamics of unemployment in response to different 
structural shocks. Thereby, a structural shock represents an unexpected change in 
a specific variable and is based on assumptions about its dynamic interaction with 
other variables.
The study employs a vectorautoregressive (VAR) model that captures the job 
finding and separation rates as well as productivity, interest rate and government 
spending. The latter variables are necessary to identify the structural shocks 
of interest, i.e. a technology shock, a monetary policy shock and a fiscal policy 
shock. Accordingly, the study identifies both supply- and demand-side shocks. 
This approach implies a combination of short- and long-run restrictions and thus 
requires a numeric estimation procedure. Given the conditional movements of the 
job finding and separation rates, the study then derives the resulting unemployment 
response based on its law of motion.
A particular objective of the study is to evaluate whether the unemployment 
adjustment process varies with the identified shocks or whether it is similar across 
shocks. The study discusses the responses to the different shocks and assesses their 
relative importance for the transition rates. In addition, the study analyzes the 
persistence of shocks to get a better understanding of the results.
This study is joint work with Enzo Weber and available as IAB Discussion Paper 
(see Nordmeier and Weber, 2013).
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1.2.3 A Selection-Based Interpretation of the Matching Function
The third essay investigates the matching function. In its simplest and prevalent 
specification, the matching function determines the number of matches according 
to a Cobb-Douglas form: 
M = AU aV b,  (1.2)
where the scale parameter A is referred to as the matching efficiency and a and 
b denote the matching elasticities of unemployment and vacancies, respectively.
The study examines the common practice of applying a Cobb-Douglas matching 
function from both an empirical and a theoretical point of view. In a first step, 
the study performs several matching function estimations based on a precise 
measurement of the key variables. The study particularly proves the standard 
assumption of constant returns to scale, i.e. a + b = 1. Then, it turns to restricted 
matching elasticities and extends the baseline specification by a large set of control 
variables, which account for composition effects of the unemployment pool as well 
as institutional aspects.
In a second step, the study explores the empirical matching function by using 
a labor selection model. The model provides a more in-depth formulation of the 
firms’ hiring process and thus obviates the matching function. A simulated version 
of the model, however, allows to imitate the empirical analysis of the aggregate 
matching function. The study compares the simulation-based results with the 
empirical evidence and explains the underlying mechanism analytically.
This study is joint work with Britta Kohlbrecher and Christian Merkl and 
available as LASER Discussion Paper (see Kohlbrecher et al., 2013).
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2  Worker Flows in Germany:  
Inspecting the Time Aggregation Bias
This paper analyzes the effects of time aggregation in the measurement of 
worker flows by exploiting daily information from German administrative data. 
Time aggregation caused by comparing monthly labor market states leads to 
an underestimation of total worker flows by around 10%, which is larger than 
the prediction of a theoretical correction approach. Multiple labor market 
transitions within a month induce a procyclical bias in the job finding rate, but 
not in the separation rate. This observation may reveal some facts about quits. The 
reconsideration of the total transition rates shows a strong cyclicality of German 
worker flows, where the job finding rate appears to play a larger role in explaining 
unemployment fluctuations.
2.1 Introduction
Worker flows play a crucial role for understanding labor market dynamics. Modern 
labor market theory explicitly accounts for the continuous process of job findings 
and separations, and thereby intends to match stylized facts of labor market data. 
Data on worker flows are typically observed by comparing individual labor market 
states at a monthly or quarterly frequency. This procedure, however, induces a 
downward bias if individuals face multiple labor market transitions within two 
measurement points.
The objective of this paper is to analyze the so-called time aggregation bias 
by using German administrative labor market data. In addition to the absence 
of sample rotation and sample attrition,1 German administrative data have the 
advantage of daily information. As every daily change of the individuals’ labor 
market status can be taken into account, worker flows based on this information 
do not face a time aggregation bias. Nevertheless, German administrative data 
allow to derive one by additionally computing labor market transitions at a lower 
frequency.2
Being aware of a time aggregation bias in his monthly measured worker flows, 
Shimer (2005) points out that the U.S. job separation rate is nearly acyclic. Shimer 
(2012) reinforces a procyclical time aggregation bias in the separation rate by 
1 In a survey data set, sample rotation and sample attrition involve a margin error as workers fail to be matched. See 
Fujita and Ramey (2006) for a more detailed description.
2 This procedure abstracts from workers who find and lose a job within a day and vice versa. However, losing a job 
and finding another job within a day is rather referred to direct job-to-job transitions which are beyond the scope 
of this paper.
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formulating a correction approach for neglected worker flows. Since a draft of his paper 
was circulated, Shimer’s correction approach has evolved to a standard approach to 
adjust for time aggregation (see, e.g., Fujita and Ramey, 2006; 2009; Petrongolo and 
Pissarides, 2008; Gomes, 2012). Moreover, Shimer’s conclusion of a nearly acyclical 
separation rate has led many studies to assume an exogenous separation rate when 
employing the search and matching model. This development has given rise to a 
reconsideration of the cyclicality of the job finding and separation rates. In particular, 
Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Elsby et al. (2009b) caution against the assumption of an 
exogenous separation rate by demonstrating that the U.S. separation rate is strongly 
countercyclical and contributes substantially to unemployment fluctuations.3
Following a comprehensive literature dealing with U.S. labor market dynamics, 
similar studies for European countries have emerged. For example, Petrongolo 
and Pissarides (2008) focus on France, Spain and the U.K. and find deviating 
contributions of the job finding and separation rates to unemployment variations, 
which are explained by different institutional settings. Elsby et al. (2009a) 
investigate unemployment dynamics in the OECD. For Nordic and Continental 
European countries, the authors conclude that each transition rate explains half 
of unemployment fluctuations. Smith (2011) and Elsby et al. (2011) provide more 
detailed analyses for unemployment flows in the U.K. These authors demonstrate 
that the separation rate drives unemployment rises in recessions, while the job 
finding rate dominates unemployment variations in times of moderation. For 
Germany, however, the evidence on the driving forces of unemployment dynamics 
is rather scarce and has not reached a consensus yet.
While studies examining worker flows in the U.S. or other countries use 
survey data, studies on German labor market transitions are mostly based on 
administrative data (see, e.g., Bachmann, 2005; Jung and Kuhn, 2011; Gartner 
et al., 2012). Bachmann and Schaffner (2009) address this issue and compare 
worker flows computed from German administrative data with those computed 
from a German household survey. However, the authors do not find any substantial 
differences in the transition rates. Nevertheless, there is no study that exploits 
the daily information from German administrative data and investigates the time 
aggregation bias.4
This study derives a monthly measure of the time aggregation bias as suggested 
by related studies on U.S. labor market transitions. For this purpose, I use a 
new administrative data set on German labor market processes, which has two 
advantages over its precursor data set used by previous studies. First, the new data 
3 Yashiv (2007) provides a survey of further questions that concern the search and matching model.
4 To my knowledge, only Bachmann (2005) computes worker flows on a daily basis, but he does not compare them 
with labor market transitions computed at a lower frequency.
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set is representative for both employment subject to social security5 and benefit 
receipt. Second, the new data set covers a longer time period and thus provides first 
insights into the development of worker flows after the Hartz reforms.6
Moreover, I apply an unemployment definition that corrects for unemployment 
periods without benefit receipt. Those periods are most likely to result from an 
expiration of entitlements and lead to information gaps in the administrative 
data set. However, the information gaps may be relevant for measuring the time 
aggregation bias. Accordingly, the adjustment procedure addresses the fact that 
not all unemployed workers are successful in finding a job during benefit receipt 
(see Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2010).
Finally, the more comprehensive measurement of worker flows suggests a 
reconsideration of German labor market dynamics. Therefore, I complement the 
analysis of the time aggregation bias by examining the job finding and separation 
rates on business cycle frequency. In light of recent research, I investigate the 
volatility and the cyclical behavior of the transition rates and evaluate their 
contributions to unemployment fluctuations.
The results indicate that monthly point-in-time comparisons of labor market 
states lead to an underestimation of total worker flows by around 10%. The 
correction approach of Shimer (2012), however, predicts an underestimation of 
only 3%. The time aggregation bias in the job finding rate, i.e. the probability of 
finding and losing a job within a month, shows a procyclical behavior. In contrast, 
the time aggregation bias in the separation rate, i.e. the monthly reemployment 
probability of a separated worker, appears to be less affected by the business cycle. 
I argue that the different effects may reveal an opposite cyclicality of job-to-job 
transitions and the take up of unemployment benefits. The reconsideration of the 
total job finding and separation rates indicates a strong cyclicality of German 
worker flows. The job finding rate turns out to play a dominant role for explaining 
unemployment fluctuations, though the contributions of the separation rate are 
considerable as well.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data set and 
the measurement of worker flows. The time aggregation bias is investigated in 
Section  2.3. After obtaining a measure of the actual time aggregation bias and 
assessing the correction approach of Shimer (2012), the effects of time aggregation 
are evaluated on business cycle frequency. Section 2.4 reconsiders cyclical facts on 
the job finding and separation rates by considering the additional dynamics of the 
time aggregation bias. Section 2.5 concludes.
5 Employment subject to social security excludes, for example, so-called Minijobs.
6 The Hartz reforms were implemented subsequently from 2003 to 2005 and have led to major changes of German 
labor market institutions. See Jacobi and Kluve (2007) for a comprehensive description.
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2.2 Data Description
I use the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB) provided by the 
Institute for Employment Research (Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung, 
IAB). The SIAB is a 2% random sample of the Integrated Employment Biographies 
(IEB), which consists of all German residents who are characterized by at least one of 
the following labor market states during the time period 1975–2008: employment 
subject to the social security system, receipt of unemployment benefits, participation 
in active labor market policies (since 2000) and registered job search (since 2000). 
With the exception of participation in active labor market policies, the SIAB is 
representative for all included labor market states (see Dorner et al., 2010).
The main advantage of the administrative data set is the availability of daily 
information. Regardless of the data source, however, most studies rely on monthly 
point-in-time comparisons. I follow those studies and calculate the number of 
monthly worker flows, but I rely on a daily measurement. The continuous procedure 
avoids an underestimation of labor market transitions and a possible bias on 
business cycle frequency.7
According to the standard search and matching model, I focus on transitions 
between employment (E ) and unemployment (U ). To obtain time series that are 
as long as possible, the definition of unemployment is based on unemployment 
benefit receipt.8 In Germany, unemployment benefits include benefits from the 
unemployment insurance system (Arbeitslosengeld), means-tested benefits 
(Arbeitslosenhilfe/Arbeitslosengeld II) as well as income maintenance during 
training (Unterhaltsgeld).9 Even though the administrative data comprises actual 
labor market processes, it can become difficult to reconstruct a worker’s labor 
market biography if he or she loses the entitlement to unemployment benefits. This 
may result from a regular exhaustion of unemployment benefits or an irregular 
break along with a sanction.
To correct for unemployment periods without benefit receipt, I apply 
the nonemployment proxy introduced by Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010). The 
adjustment for missing unemployment periods, in particular, ensures that the 
continuous measurement of worker flows does not fail to capture relevant 
7 Strictly speaking, a daily measurement is still discrete, but this study considers it as a continuous framework.
8 See Appendix 2.A for further information on data selection.
9 Along with the Hartz IV reform the means-tested benefit system has changed. Until 2004, an unemployed worker 
could have been entitled to unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) after the expiration of an entitlement 
to unemployment insurance benefits (Arbeitslosengeld). In 2005, unemployment assistance was replaced by 
unemployment benefits II (Arbeitslosengeld II), which also covers the former social assistance (Sozialhilfe). The 
receipt of unemployment benefits II does not require a foregoing entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits, 
but it can be a supplement to insurance-based benefits if the latter do not ensure the subsistence level. 
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labor market transitions.10 Table 2.1 presents the implications of the adjustment 
procedure for unemployment durations. The first column indicates that nearly 30% 
of all benefit receipt spells have been contracted. As a consequence, the mean 
unemployment duration increases from nearly 8 months (228 days) to over 1 year 
(371 days). The standard deviation of both measures indicates that the distribution 
of unemployment durations is highly right-skewed. Moreover, the second last 
column demonstrates that unemployment benefits are even taken up for only 
1  day. In contrast, the maximum unemployment duration increases from 17.5 to 
approximately 33 years. Accordingly, there is at least one worker who is detected 
to be unemployed for more than half of his or her working life.
Table 2.1: Unemployment durations
Observations Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Benefit receipt 2,961,581 228 316 1 6,406 
Nonemployment proxy 2,101,799 371 537 1 11,992 
Note: Durations in days. 
Given the two-state environment, a worker may leave the unemployment pool and 
enter the employment state (UE flow or job finding) or leave the employment state 
and enter the unemployment pool (EU flow or separation). The worker flows are 
defined by their underlying transition rates, i.e. all transitions during month t are 
referred to the initial labor market state in month t – 1. Hence, the job finding rate 
(f ) and the separation rate (s ) satisfy 
  (2.1)
where t denotes the 10th day of a month and S denotes the number of days since 
the 10th day of the previous month.
The generated time series of the transition rates are then adjusted as follows. 
First, I account for a structural break along with the German reunification in 1990. 
Eastern German workers have been captured stepwise by the labor market registers 
and the data set is complete for the whole economy only since 1993. Therefore, I 
use time series for Western Germany until 1992 and link them to those for whole 
10 The unemployment measure is referred to as non employment proxy because it cannot ruled out that it includes 
persons out of the labor force, such as temporarily discouraged workers. More details on the unemployment 
definition are given in Appendix 2.B.
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Germany.11 Second, I smooth out seasonal effects with the Census X12 procedure. 
Third, I transform the monthly transition rates into quarterly averages to obtain 
measures at the same frequency as standard business cycle indicators.12
11 It is worth noting that the extraction of time series for Western Germany turns out vague in the early 1990s 
because the information about the place of residence is not available before 1999. For employment spells, however, 
the place of work is known throughout the sample and to acquire an entitlement to unemployment benefits a 
worker usually has to have a foregoing employment period. 
12 Using quarterly averages of monthly data is in line with the literature. In particular, Shimer (2012) explains this 
adjustment by smoothing out high-frequency fluctuations that are likely to result from survey-based measurement 
errors. Even though my measures do not face such measurement errors, this adjustment may smooth out elusive 
labor market transitions of individuals that have not been captured by data selection. Otherwise, an extrapolation 
of the worker flows would have been likely to overestimate quarterly labor market transitions. See Gomes (2012) 
for a discussion of the extrapolation error. 
Figure 2.1: Transition rates
Notes:  Solid lines show quarterly averages of monthly transition rates. Dotted lines display the HP trend with a 
smoothing parameter of λ = 1,600. Shaded areas are times of recessions.
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(b) Separation rate
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Figure 2.1 plots the time series of the aggregate transition rates from 1981 to 
2007. The job finding rate declines from over 10% in 1981 to around 5% after the 
reunification. Thus, the expected search duration for jobs subject to the German 
social security system has increased. The separation rate amounts to around 1% 
throughout the sample period. Accordingly, the average tenure of jobs subject 
to social security has been relatively constant. However, the deviations of both 
transition rates from their trend seem to follow a cyclical pattern.
The main question of this paper is what difference it would have made for 
the development of the transition rates if the daily information had not been 
considered. Therefore, the next section turns to measures computed at a lower 
frequency and inspects the resulting time aggregation bias.
2.3 Time Aggregation Bias
The time aggregation bias captures all transitions that are reversed within two 
measurement points. Figure 2.2 illustrates the time aggregation problem by 
presenting four different spell sequences Q. The measurement points are given by 
t0 and t1. In t0, one observes two unemployment spells and two employment spells. 
The spells are followed by transitions into the other labor market state at different 
dates and with different durations. The new labor market states in Q1 and Q3 
persist until the next measurement point, and thus each labor market transition is 
taken into account by the discrete measurement. However, the new labor market 
states in Q2 and Q4 do not persist until the next measurement point because 
there is a preceding labor market transition in the opposite direction. Hence, in t1, 
one observes the same labor market state as in t0. As a consequence, the discrete 
measurement neglects the transitions in Q2 and Q4, and the resulting number of 
worker flows is underestimated.
Figure 2.2: Point-in-time measurement
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t
IAB-Bibliothek 34628
Worker Flows in Germany: Inspecting the Time Aggregation Bias
To address recent conclusions on the time aggregation bias, this section proceeds 
closely to the related literature on U.S. labor market dynamics. After briefly outlining 
the related studies, I extract a measure from monthly point-in-time comparisons 
and compare it with the prediction of the correction approach suggested by Shimer 
(2012). I then present cyclical properties of the monthly time aggregation bias and 
explore the effects on unemployment decomposition.
2.3.1 Related Literature
The recent discussion on the effects of time aggregation in the measurement of 
worker flows is triggered by Shimer (2005). The author assumes a procyclical time 
aggregation bias in the separation rate and concludes that the U.S. separation 
rate is nearly acyclic. Shimer (2012) complements this conclusion by deriving a 
correction approach for time aggregation. He relates discretely measured transition 
rates to a continuous-time framework by assuming that during a given time period 
all unemployed workers face the same job finding probability and all employed 
workers face the same separation probability.
More specific, Shimer argues that “ignoring time aggregation will bias a 
researcher towards finding a countercyclical employment exit probability, because 
when the job finding probability falls, a worker who loses her job is more likely 
to experience a measured spell of unemployment” (Shimer, 2012, p. 129). With 
respect to Figure 2.2, Shimer’s argument implies that in economic upswings there 
is a significantly higher share of spell sequences Q4 compared to Q3, meaning that 
the time aggregation bias in the separation rate is procyclical. Accordingly, Shimer 
claims that the share of observed unemployment spells varies with the business 
cycle.
Obviously, the discrete measurement of spell sequence Q4 also neglects a job 
finding as well as in Q2. However, Shimer argues that “because the probability of 
losing a job during the month is comparatively small, time aggregation causes 
relatively little bias in the job finding rate” (Shimer, 2012, p.  131). Hence, short 
employment spells should be less relevant when measuring the job finding rate.
A prominent reply to Shimer’s argument of a procyclical time aggregation bias 
in the separation rate is given by Fujita and Ramey (2006). The authors apply the 
correction approach of Shimer (2012) for monthly U.S. data and show that although 
the level of the time aggregation bias is considerable, the cyclical fluctuations of 
the adjusted and unadjusted transition rates display a very similar pattern. Thus, 
Fujita and Ramey (2006) conclude that the effect of time aggregation on the 
cyclical behavior of the transition rates is negligible. 
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Nekarda (2009) provides a more comprehensive analysis of the time aggregation 
bias in U.S. worker flows. The author compares monthly point-in-time measures 
from the commonly used Current Population Survey (CPS) with weekly information 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) and detects that the 
true number of monthly transitions is underestimated by 15–24%. In addition, 
Nekarda (2009) shows that the time aggregation bias in both job findings and 
separations is procyclical. As these effects nearly offset each other, the author 
concludes that time aggregation induces a cyclical bias neither in discretely 
measured gross flows nor in their underlying transition rates. Nevertheless, when 
he adjusts the worker flows according to the correction approach of Shimer (2012), 
Nekarda (2009) finds a lower contribution of the separation rate to steady state 
unemployment fluctuations.
2.3.2 A Monthly Measure
In contrast to U.S. studies, I extract a measure of the time aggregation bias that 
is based on daily information and stems from a single data source. Therefore, I 
compute worker flows from monthly point-in-time comparisons and confront 
them with the continuous measures presented in the previous section.
The discretely measured job finding and separation rates are given by 
  (2.2)
where t again denotes the 10th day of a month. As a first piece of evidence, 
Figure 2.C.1 in the Appendix contrasts the discretely measured transition rates 
with their continuous counterparts. It can be seen that the discrete measures are 
significantly lower than the continuous ones, but they seem to develop in a similar 
manner.
The resulting time aggregation bias (δ ) is defined by the difference between 
the continuously measured transition rates from Equation 2.1 and the discretely 
measured transition rates from Equation 2.2, i.e. 
  (2.3)
where i = f, s. Hence, the time aggregation bias denotes the aggregate probability 
that a transition will be reversed within one month.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of time aggregation bias
Job finding rate Separation rate 
Actual Estimated Actual Estimated 
(1981–2007) (1981–2007) (1981–2007) (1981–2007) 
Mean 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.000 
Relative to total measures 0.101 0.031 0.094 0.031 
Standard deviation 0.103 0.146 0.070 0.067 
Relative to total measures 1.296 1.827 1.092 1.040 
Autocorrelation 0.621 0.573 0.428 0.465 
Relative to total measures 1.002 0.924 0.750 0.814 
Notes:  Mean refers to the level. Standard deviations and autocorrelations account for log deviations from the HP 
trend with λ = 1,600. Total measures are the continuously measured transition rates.
Table 2.2 reports descriptive statistics of the monthly time aggregation bias, 
where the first and third columns refer to Equation 2.3 (i.e. the actual bias). 
Admittedly, the probabilities of reversing a job finding or a separation within 
one month are quite low with means of 0.6% and 0.1%, respectively. In relation 
to the continuously measured transition rates, however, the time aggregation 
bias appears to be important. The comparison of monthly labor market states 
leads to an underestimation of total worker flows by around 10%. This number 
is fairly the half of what Nekarda (2009) reports for U.S. worker flows; however, 
it seems to be considerable as the German labor market is known to be less 
flexible.
Figures 2.C.2 and 2.C.3 show the development of the time aggregation bias over 
the sample period, where the solid lines refer to the actual bias. In fact, the bias 
shows significant fluctuations. The probability of reversing a job finding within one 
month fluctuates by around 0.8% in the 1980s, falls to around 0.4% in the 1990s, 
and then increases gradually to 0.6%. Thus, the probability of quickly returning to 
unemployment from a new job that is subject to social security decreases after the 
reunification, but in the late 1990s those new jobs again turn out to be less stable 
in the one-month horizon. The probability of a monthly reversed separation, i.e. the 
probability of finding a new job within one month after becoming unemployed, 
fluctuates by around 0.1%, but it also shows an upward trend since the late 1990s. 
This development holds in relation to the total transition rates. The relative time 
aggregation bias increases up to 14% in the second part of the sample period.
The recent rise of the time aggregation bias may reveal some effects of labor 
market reforms that have been implemented to increase labor market flexibility. 
For example, tightened job acceptance regulations are intended to stimulate 
returns to employment, while facilitation of temporary work and a weaker 
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dismissal protection are supposed to boost job findings in general. In fact, the 
interpretation of an increased flexibility can be reconciled with the result of Fahr 
and Sunde (2009) who find an accelerated matching process along with the Hartz 
reforms.
2.3.3 The Shimer (2012) Correction Approach
The correction approach of Shimer (2012) intends to account for worker flows 
that are neglected by discrete measurements. Fujita and Ramey (2006) apply the 
three-state approach of Shimer (2012) for a two-state model and derive estimates 
for continuous-time transition rates, i.e. job finding and separation rates that are 
adjusted for time aggregation.13 The adjusted transition rates result as: 
 (2.4)
where t again denotes the 10th day of a month. As can be seen from Figure 2.C.1, 
the adjusted transition rates evolve above the discrete measures, but they do not 
reach the level of the continuously measured transition rates.
To evaluate how well the theoretical correction approach accounts for the 
actual time aggregation bias, I also extract the time aggregation bias that results 
from the correction approach. Therefore, I take the difference between the adjusted 
transition rates from Equation 2.4 and the unadjusted measures from Equation 2.2, 
i.e. the estimated time aggregation bias ( ) satisfies 
  (2.5)
where i = f, s.
Figures 2.C.2 and 2.C.3 show that the estimated bias is significantly lower than 
the actual time aggregation bias. On average, the correction approach predicts that 
monthly point-in-time comparisons underestimate total worker flows by only 3% 
(see also the second and forth columns in Table 2.2). Moreover, Figure 2.C.4 displays 
the coverage of the correction approach over the sample period. The estimated 
time aggregation bias accounts for a declining fraction of the actual bias. The 
coverage amounts to more than 50% at the beginning of the sample period and 
then decreases to around 20%.
13 For a two-state labor market model, Shimer (2012) provides an alternative correction approach, which uses a 
measure of short-term unemployment to obtain the job finding rate. For an application of this approach see Elsby 
et al. (2009). 
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The low coverage may result from the key assumption underlying the correction 
approach. Recall that the correction approach assumes constant transition rates 
during a time period, i.e. all unemployed workers have the same probability of 
finding a job and all employed workers have the same probability of losing their 
job. In other words, the correction approach abstracts from worker heterogeneity 
arising from duration dependence or individual characteristics. However, Kluve 
et al. (2009) analyze individual transition rates for Germany and find significant 
differences between specific demographic groups. Accordingly, the correction 
approach may be more practical for adjusting disaggregate worker flows.
2.3.4 Cyclical Properties
A central question is whether time aggregation involves a cyclical bias in discretely 
measured worker flows. To address the arguments of Shimer (2005; 2012), I 
extract the cyclical components of the time aggregation bias by computing the log 
deviations from the underlying Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend.14 
Table 2.2 presents standard deviations and autocorrelation coefficients of the 
cyclical components. The time aggregation bias in the job finding rate appears to be 
more volatile than in the separation rate. Interestingly, the bias in both transition 
rates is more volatile than the transition rates themselves, i.e. the probabilities of 
reversing a transition within one month react more sensitively to business cycle 
shocks than the total transition rates. In addition, the cyclical bias in the job 
finding rate is more persistent than in the separation rate, where the latter is even 
less persistent than the total separation rate.
To examine the cyclical behavior of the time aggregation bias, I use output, 
labor productivity and unemployment as business cycle indicators. Figure 2.3 
shows cross correlations of the cyclical components. With respect to all three 
business cycle indicators, the time aggregation bias in the job finding rate displays 
a procyclical behavior. Even though the contemporaneous correlations with output 
and productivity are less striking (approximately 0.3), they are relatively strong 
with unemployment (-0.6). In addition, the time aggregation bias in the job finding 
rate tends to lead the cycle, because it reaches its peak correlation with output at 
a lag of four and with unemployment at a lag of one. The procyclical behavior of 
the time aggregation bias in the job finding rate indicates that economic upswings 
are associated with a significantly higher share of workers who leave and return to 
unemployment within one month.
14 I use the standard smoothing parameter of λ = 1,600 for quarterly data. 
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Figure 2.3: Cross correlations of time aggregation bias with business cycle indicators
Notes:  Log deviations from HP trend with λ = 1,600. Solid lines show the actual time aggregation bias and dashed 
lines the estimated time aggregation bias. Measure i along the abscissa accounts for leads (positive values) 
and lags (negative values) at a quarterly frequency. Output measures gross domestic product (GDP). Labor 
productivity is the ratio of GDP to total hours worked.
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In contrast, the cyclical behavior of the time aggregation bias in the separation rate 
is less distinctive. One may argue that there is also a procyclical pattern at higher 
lags, but the peak correlations are lower than for the job finding rate. In addition, 
the contemporaneous correlations show opposite signs and the correlation with 
productivity is even close to zero. A rather acyclical behavior is also indicated by 
the estimated time aggregation bias in the separation rate, though it reflects the 
actual bias worse than for the job finding rate. Consequently, the time aggregation 
bias in the separation rate does not reveal that monthly time aggregation neglects 
a significantly higher share of unemployment spells in economic upswings as 
emphasized by Shimer (2005; 2012).
However, Shimer argues that using the HP filter with the standard smoothing 
parameter “seems to remove much of the cyclical volatility in the variable of 
interest” (Shimer, 2012, footnote 10) and therefore suggests a smoothing 
parameter of λ = 105. I check the robustness of the preceding results by using the 
higher smoothing parameter. Indeed, the time aggregation bias in the separation 
rate becomes more volatile and more persistent in relation to the total separation 
rate (see Table 2.D.1), but there is still no indication for a procyclical behavior (see 
Figure 2.D.1). Instead, using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of λ = 105 
turns out to be less suitable for German business cycle fluctuations, because 
the positive correlations of the bias in the job finding rate with both output 
and productivity disappear.15 Accordingly, I focus on the standard smoothing 
parameter.
The procyclical time aggregation bias in the job finding rate may be reconciled 
with a procyclical behavior of quits. A higher relevance of short employment periods 
in economic upswings may indicate that workers are more willing to quit a new job 
in good times, while they keep their jobs longer in bad times. Hence, the prospect of a 
better job even seems to make a worker to accept a further unemployment period in 
upswings. As labor demand is high, the expected unemployment duration is relatively 
short. This can be also underpinned by a procyclical behavior of the job finding rate.
On the one hand, the acyclical time aggregation bias in the separation rate 
appears to challenge a procyclical behavior of the job finding rate, because it 
implies that the share of monthly unemployment periods is constant over the 
business cycle. On the other hand, the acyclical bias in the separation rate may 
also indicate a procyclical behavior of job-to-job transitions. This interpretation, in 
turn, would strengthen the argument of a higher quit rate in good times. Hence, 
unemployment periods are not only shorter in economic upswings, but they are 
15 This may challenge the view that the choice of the smoothing parameter has only little effects on relative terms 
(see, e.g., Hornstein et al., 2005).
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also less likely to occur. The latter can have two reasons. Either workers are more 
likely to change to new employers within a day (direct job-to-job transition) 
or workers are less likely to take up unemployment benefits in case of a short 
transition period (indirect job-to-job transition). Recall that the nonemployment 
proxy solely corrects for unemployment periods before and after benefit receipt but 
not between two employment spells, because the latter case is considered to be a 
deliberated employment interruption.
2.3.5 Effects on Unemployment Decomposition
Given the cyclicality of the time aggregation bias, a further question concerns 
the extent to which monthly time aggregation affects the variance decomposition 
of labor market states. Therefore, I apply a conventional variance decomposition 
of unemployment fluctuations and compare the contributions of the different 
measures of the transition rates.
The conventional variance decomposition of unemployment assumes that the 
actual unemployment rate moves closely to the steady state unemployment rate. 
Thus, the actual unemployment rate ut is approximated by 
  (2.6)
where * indicates the steady state value.
Fujita and Ramey (2009) demonstrate that the variance of the detrended steady 
state unemployment rate can be decomposed into the detrended transition rates. 
The relative contributions of the transition rate are summarized by 
  (2.7)
where d indicates a detrending method and i = f, s. Note that there also arises 
a residual term ε, which constitutes the approximation error and contributes to 
unemployment variations with .
Table 2.3 shows the contributions of the transition rates, where the first row 
refers to the continuous measures. The job finding rate turns out to play a larger 
role for German unemployment variations. Fluctuations in the job finding rate 
account for 55% and fluctuations in the separation rate contribute 42%. These 
numbers can be reconciled with the conclusion of Elsby et al. (2009a) that the job 
finding and separation rates are equally important for unemployment fluctuations 
in Continental European countries. Focusing on the post-reunification period even 
reinforces a 50:50 split.
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Table 2.3: Contributions to steady state unemployment fluctuations
Job finding rate Separation rate 
Full 
sample 
(1981–2007) 
Reunified 
Germany 
(1993–2007) 
Full 
sample 
(1981–2007) 
Reunified 
Germany 
(1993–2007) 
Continuous measures 0.550 0.534 0.424 0.471 
Discrete measures 0.534 0.524 0.444 0.481 
Adjusted measures 0.546 0.534 0.431 0.471 
Note: Log deviations from HP trend with λ = 1,600. 
The second row displays the variance decomposition using the discretely measured 
transition rates. Due to the time aggregation bias the contribution of the job finding 
rate is underestimated and the contribution of the separation rate is overestimated. 
However, the deviation does not exceed 2 percentage points. In the subsample, the 
deviation accounts for only 1 percentage point.
The unemployment decomposition based on the adjusted transition rates is 
shown in the third row of Table 2.3. It can be seen that the correction approach of 
Shimer (2012) is able to counter the deviation and actually removes it in the post-
reunification period. Hence, the observation of Nekarda (2009) that the theoretical 
correction approach leads to a distorted contribution of the separation rate cannot 
be confirmed.
Applying Shimer’s smoothing parameter of λ = 105 verifies the preceding results 
(see Table 2.D.2). Interestingly, the continuously measured transition rates show 
the same contributions as with the standard smoothing parameter. The adjusted 
measures again correct the biased contributions in the right direction. However, in 
the subsample the bias becomes larger and the contributions of the job finding and 
separation rates diverge more. The same holds for the approximation error of the 
variance decomposition. Thus, doubts on the suitability of the higher smoothing 
parameter arise once more.
Moreover, I follow Fujita and Ramey (2009) and check the robustness of the 
variance decomposition by using first differences as an alternative detrending 
method. Table 2.D.3 shows the results. The contributions of the continuously 
measured job finding and separation rates are of the same magnitude as before 
and appear to be robust. However, using first differences the time aggregation bias 
works in the opposite direction. It increases the contribution of the job finding 
rate and lowers the contribution of the separation rate. In addition, adjusting 
the discretely measured transition rates with the correction approach of Shimer 
(2012) boosts the time aggregation bias. Accordingly, using first differences, I can 
confirm the finding of Nekarda (2009) that applying the theoretical correction 
approach can distort the role of the separation rate. This observation, in turn, 
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may indicate a sensitivity of the correction approach with respect to detrending 
methods.
2.4 Stylized Facts of German Worker Flows
The preceding section has shown that the additional dynamics of the time 
aggregation bias affect both the level and the cyclicality of worker flows. Moreover, 
the acyclical behavior of the bias in the separation rate suggests a relevance of 
unemployment periods without benefit receipt. Previous studies on German 
labor market fluctuations do not apply the nonemployment proxy to measure 
unemployment periods, but focus on benefit receipt instead. Thereby, Jung and 
Kuhn (2011) find a larger volatility of the separation rate along with a larger 
contribution to unemployment fluctuations. Gartner et al. (2012), however, use a 
broader definition of worker flows and observe similar volatilities of the job finding 
and separation rates.
This section investigates the cyclicality of German worker flows by using the 
continuously measured transition rates defined in Section 2.2. In particular, I 
reconsider the stylized facts about the cyclical components of the transition rates 
and discuss their contributions to unemployment fluctuations. I also apply an 
alternative variance decomposition that has been suggested for countries with low 
labor turnover.
2.4.1 Cyclical Components
Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics of the cyclical components of the job 
finding and separation rates.16 It can be seen that the job finding rate is more 
volatile than the separation rate. The standard deviation of the job finding rate 
amounts to 8% and the standard deviation of the separation rate is 6%. The 
volatility of both transition rates declines after the reunification. In relation to the 
business cycle indicators, however, the transition rates become more volatile in the 
post-reunification period. The relative rise implies that the standard deviations of 
output, productivity and unemployment have decreased more strongly than that of 
the transition rates.
In particular, the volatility ratios with respect to productivity are striking. With 
factors of 12–15 and 10–13, respectively, German job finding and separation rates 
16 As before, the cyclical components are computed as log deviations from the underlying HP trend with the standard 
smoothing parameter of λ = 1,600. 
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even appear to be more volatile than U.S. transition rates.17 In terms of the Shimer 
puzzle, productivity shocks thus seem to have a remarkably strong amplification effect 
in Germany. However, the relatively large volatility ratio with respect to productivity 
can also imply that productivity shocks are not the actual source of German labor 
market fluctuations and thus play a minor role (e.g., compared to output shocks).18
The autocorrelation coefficients indicate that the cyclical component of the job 
finding rate is slightly more persistent than that of the separation rate. Moreover, 
the fluctuations of the transition rates are similar persistent as those of output and 
productivity, but they are less persistent than the fluctuations of unemployment. 
The latter relation can be reconciled with the hysteresis problem of German 
unemployment.
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of transition rates
Job finding rate Separation rate 
Full 
Sample 
(1981–2007) 
Reunified 
Germany 
(1993–2007) 
Full 
Sample 
(1981–2007) 
Reunified 
Germany 
(1993–2007) 
Standard deviation 0.080 0.069 0.064 0.062 
Relative to output 6.975 8.379 5.632 7.519 
Relative to productivity 12.213 14.560 9.861 13.065 
Relative to unemployment 1.085 1.136 0.876 1.019 
Autocorrelation 0.620 0.595 0.571 0.580 
Relative to output 1.225 1.181 1.128 1.151 
Relative to productivity 1.419 0.982 1.307 0.957 
Relative to unemployment 0.697 0.663 0.642 0.649 
Notes:  Log deviations from HP trend with λ = 1,600. Output measures gross domestic product (GDP). Productivity 
is the ratio of GDP to total hours worked.
Figure 2.4 shows the cyclical behavior of the transition rates. It can be seen that 
the job finding rate is procyclical and the separation rate is countercyclical. The 
peak correlations of the job finding and separation rates with output are 0.4 and 
-0.4, respectively, and turn out to be stronger after the reunification (0.6 and -0.6, 
respectively). In addition, the peak correlations with output indicate a rather leading 
behavior of the transition rates, whereas the peak correlations with productivity 
show a rather lagging behavior. The cross correlations with productivity are lower 
17 Most prominently, Shimer (2005) finds for the U.S. that the volatility of the job finding rate is 6 and that of the 
separation rate is 4 times as large as the volatility of labor productivity (so-called Shimer puzzle).
18 See also Balleer (2012), who studies the Shimer puzzle for U.S. labor market fluctuations. 
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than with output, which again raises the question on the importance of productivity 
shocks for German labor market fluctuations.
Moreover, both transition rates show high and well-shaped cross correlations 
with unemployment. The correlation between the job finding rate and 
unemployment reaches nearly -0.8, while the correlation between the separation 
rate and unemployment is up to 0.6. The peak correlations with unemployment arise 
at lags of 1-2 quarters, meaning that the transition rates precede unemployment. 
This might reinforce that the transition rates are referred to as the driving forces of 
unemployment fluctuations (see Fujita and Ramey, 2006).
2.4.2 Contributions to Unemployment Fluctuations
The contributions of worker flows to unemployment fluctuations have become 
a major topic because they have important policy implications. In Section  2.3.5, 
the variance decomposition of the steady state unemployment rate has 
shown that the job finding rate plays a slightly dominant role for explaining 
unemployment fluctuations. For France, Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) also 
find a larger role of the unemployment outflow rate, which they explain by a 
strict employment protection. Germany is also known for a strict employment 
protection; thus, the result of a larger role of the German job finding rate 
appears to be plausible.
However, Elsby et al. (2009a) argue that the steady state unemployment rate 
is a weak approximation for the actual unemployment rate if labor turnover is 
low. On average, the sum of the monthly job finding and separation rates amounts 
to only 7% in Germany (see Figure 2.1). Figure 2.5 demonstrates the resulting 
divergence of the actual and steady state unemployment rates. The steady state 
unemployment rate mainly overestimates the actual unemployment rate, where 
the deviations become more relevant in times of recessions. After the reunification, 
the deviations even range up to 5 percentage points. Moreover, the actual 
unemployment rate moves quite gradually, while the steady state unemployment 
rate exhibits rapid changes.
Therefore, Elsby et al. (2009a) conclude that the steady state variance 
decomposition is inappropriate for unemployment rates in Continental European 
countries. The authors propose a procedure that decomposes the variance of actual 
unemployment. The so-called non-steady state variance decomposition allows 
actual unemployment to deviate from its steady state and captures the influence of 
both contemporaneous and lagged fluctuations of the transition rates. In addition, 
Smith (2011) demonstrates that the lower the job finding and separation rates, the 
larger is the relative impact of past variations.
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Figure 2.4: Cross correlations of transition rates with business cycle indicators
Notes:  Log deviations from HP trend with λ = 1,600. Solid lines refer to the full sample period (1981–2007) and 
dashed lines to the post-reunification period (1993–2007). Measure i along the abscissa accounts for 
leads (positive values) and lags (negative values) at a quarterly frequency. Output measures gross domestic 
product (GDP). Labor productivity is the ratio of GDP to total hours worked.
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The approach of Elsby et al. (2009a) considers unemployment fluctuations as first 
differences of the log unemployment rate. Then, the relative contributions are 
given by 
  (2.8)
where i = f, s, 0. C ft and C 
s
t denote the cumulative contributions of current and past 
variations in the job finding and separation rates. C0t describes the contribution of 
the deviation of actual unemployment from its steady state at the beginning of the 
sample period, where C00 = Δlogu0 measures the value of the initial deviation. The 
share of the residual component ε now satisfies β
ε
 = 1 – βf – βs – β0.19
To allow for time variation in the relative contributions, I follow Smith (2011) 
and compute rolling βi’s. Moreover, I convert the monthly job finding and separation 
rates into annual averages and investigate their contributions in different time 
horizons. Figure 2.6 presents the results. The relative contributions of the transition 
rates indeed vary considerably over time. In the 3-year periods, the contributions of 
the transition rates display an alternating pattern. Nevertheless, it is worth noting 
that the separation rate contributes about 80% to unemployment changes in the 
periods 1984–1986 and 1989–1991.
19 For a more detailed description of the non-steady state decomposition see Elsby et al. (2009a, p. 18f).
Figure 2.5: Unemployment rates
Notes:  The solid line shows the actual unemployment rate and the dashed line the steady state unemployment 
rate. Time series show quarterly averages of monthly measures. Shaded areas are times of recessions.
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Figure 2.6: Contribution to actual unemployment fluctuations
Notes:  First differences of log variables. Solid lines refer to the job finding rate and dashed lines to the separation 
rate. Variables are annual averages of monthly measures.
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Turning to 5-year periods, the high contributions of the separation rate disappear and 
fluctuations in the job finding rate seem to be at least as important as those in the 
separation rate. The contributions of the job finding rate amount to 20–60%, while 
the contributions of the separation rate even shrink to nearly 0% in the early 1990s 
and 2000s. Apart from the outlier of the job finding rate in the 7-year periods, the 
contributions become smoother with longer time frames and the relative importance 
of the transition rates turns out more clearly. In the longer time horizons, the two 
transition rates explain about 60% of actual unemployment variations, where the job 
finding rate accounts for 40% and the separation rate contributes 20%.
To sum up, the non-steady state variance decomposition reveals a relevance of 
both the job finding rate and the separation rate for understanding unemployment 
fluctuations in Germany; however, the job finding rate appears to be the dominant 
force in longer time frames. Hence, the result of the non-steady state variance 
decomposition does not depart from the conclusion of the conventional steady 
state variance decomposition, but the decomposition of the actual unemployment 
rate provides a more realistic picture of labor market dynamics.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the effects of time aggregation in the measurement of 
worker flows, which has stimulated recent research on U.S. labor market dynamics. 
Therefore, I have exploited daily information from German administrative data and 
computed monthly job finding and separation rates.
In particular, I have compared three measures of worker flows: one that 
considers every daily change of the individuals’ labor market status, one that 
compares the individuals’ labor market status at a specific day per month and one 
that applies the correction approach of Shimer (2012), which intends to account 
for neglected worker flows in discrete measurements.
The comparison of discretely and continuously measured worker flows reveals that 
monthly point-in-time measurements underestimate total worker flows by around 
10% in Germany. Applying the correction approach of Shimer (2012), however, predicts 
an underestimation of only 3%. Hence, the homogeneity assumption underlying the 
theoretical correction approach appears to be too strong for German worker flows 
and thus may be more practical for disaggregate labor market transitions.
Moreover, this paper has analyzed the cyclical properties of the time 
aggregation bias by using different business cycle indicators. The time aggregation 
bias in the job finding rate shows a procyclical behavior, which implies more short 
employment periods in economic upswings. In contrast, the time aggregation 
bias in the separation rate is relatively unaffected by the business cycle, which 
IAB-Bibliothek 34644
Worker Flows in Germany: Inspecting the Time Aggregation Bias
may challenge the claim of Shimer (2005; 2012) that a monthly point-in-time 
measurement neglects more unemployment spells in booms.
However, the results are more likely to reveal some facts about quits. Better job 
opportunities in upswings appear to induce a higher willingness of workers to quit 
a (new) job. If a quitting worker has not found a more suitable job yet, it is likely 
that he or she registers at an employment agency and applies for unemployment 
benefits. However, if a quitting worker faces only a short transition period to 
another job, it seems to be more likely that he or she refuses to register at an 
employment agency. Accordingly, the incidence of indirect job-to-job transitions 
may influence the take up of unemployment benefits and vice versa.
Finally, this paper has analyzed the cyclicality of the job finding and separation 
rates by considering the additional dynamics of the time aggregation bias. Both 
transition rates reinforce a high volatility and a strong cyclical behavior of German 
worker flows. Fluctuations in the job finding rate turn out to play a dominant role 
in explaining unemployment fluctuations; however, this result seems to be less 
influenced by the time aggregation bias.
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2.A Data Selection
In contrast to theoretical labor market models, where workers are assumed to be 
either employed or unemployed, the SIAB may include parallel employment and 
unemployment spells due to the merging of different registers. Parallel notifications 
can occur when a recipient of unemployment benefits has a spare-time work 
(so-called Hinzuverdiener) or an employed worker loses his or her second job 
and becomes part-time unemployed. However, the data set suffers also from 
inconsistent spells, which make it difficult to identify the main labor market status. 
Jaenichen et al. (2005) inspect overlapping spells in German administrative data and 
detect employment spells to be more reliable than unemployment spells. Therefore, 
employment spells have priority in determining the actual labor market status.
Moreover, I refine the data set as follows. From the employment pool, I 
exclude apprentices, trainees, family assistants as well as recipients of early 
retirement pension or compensations allowance. I also drop marginal employment 
(geringfügige Beschäftigung), which is covered by the social security system only 
since 1999. Omitting marginal employment avoids that unemployed persons with 
a spare-time work are counted as employed. In addition, I drop workers with 
more than 50 employment spells per year, which may occur with artists or other 
freelancers. Besides, the data set does not cover self-employment and civil services.
From benefit receipt, I drop persons who are not attached to the labor 
force. These include, for example, non-employable persons who live with a 
recipient of unemployment benefits II in a so-called community of needs 
(Bedarfsgemeinschaft). Due to administrative reasons all persons of a community 
of needs have to be registered by the employment agencies. However, the data 
set does not include all notifications of unemployment benefits II in 2005/2006 
along with the change in the benefit system. Therefore, I consider job search spells 
of unemployed workers in these years if a corresponding notification of benefit 
receipt is missing. In addition, reports of benefit receipt are incomplete in the late 
1970s, but they cannot be adjusted. Consequently, the analysis starts in 1980.
The resulting sample consists of 1,418,952 persons and 27,267,428 spells.
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2.B  A Nonemployment Proxy according to Fitzenberger and 
Wilke (2010)
This study applies the nonemployment proxy introduced by Fitzenberger and Wilke 
(2010) for German administrative labor market data. The nonemployment proxy is 
an useful measure to approximate unemployment by relying on notifications of 
unemployment benefit receipt. It consists of all nonemployment periods after an 
employment spell if at least one benefit receipt notification is available. Thus, the 
nonemployment proxy includes both unemployment periods with benefit receipt 
and unemployment periods without benefit receipt. If the last notification of 
benefit receipt is not followed by any further notification, the nonemployment 
proxy is treated as right censored.
Figure 2.B.1: Filled information gaps
Notes:  Absolute numbers are the difference between the nonemployment proxy and benefit receipt. Relative 
numbers show the difference in relation to the nonemployment proxy.
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I consider information gaps before and after unemployment benefit receipt. The 
information gaps may also cover periods of marginal employment, because it has 
been dropped before. A marginal employment, however, is likely to be a temporary 
arrangement, which might justify that a marginally employed worker is assumed 
to search for a regular job anymore. The same may apply for an intervening period 
of self-employment as it has become an instrument of active labor market policy.
I fill only nonemployment periods by up to one year, which captures over 80% 
of all relevant information gaps. The restriction to one year particularly avoids a 
too extensive measure of unemployment. The observation period then reduces to 
1981–2007 to ensure a high filling degree over the whole sample period.
Figure 2.B.1 illustrates the number of filled information gaps. The difference 
between benefit receipt and the nonemployment proxy amounts to around 
5,000  workers in the 1980s and nearly 10,000 persons in the 1990s. Following 
the consolidation of the means-tested benefit systems in 2005, information gaps 
occur with over 18,000 persons afterwards. In relative terms, the adjustment 
of benefit receipt accounts for 20% of the unemployment pool in 1981. The 
significance of the adjustment procedure then declines to around 10% in the 
1990s/early 2000s. Since 2005 the filling of information gaps again becomes 
more relevant and amounts to 18% of the unemployment pool. The latter rise is 
likely to result from shortened entitlement periods of unemployment benefits as 
well as tightened sanctions, which have been implemented in the course of the 
Hartz reforms.
Figure 2.B.2: Unemployment measures
Notes:  The solid line presents the projected nonemployment proxy (quarterly averages of monthly data).  
The dashed line is the ILO unemployment measure (interpolation of yearly data provided by the National 
Accounts). The time period 1990-1992 exhibits the stepwise inclusion of Eastern Germany in labor market 
registers.
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Moreover, Figure 2.B.2 confronts the nonemployment proxy with a survey-based 
unemployment measure according to the definition of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO). It can be seen that the two unemployment measures fluctuate 
in a similar manner. However, the nonemployment proxy tends to be higher than 
the survey-based measure. The difference is likely to indicate a significance of 
marginal employment. The Federal Employment Agency allows unemployed 
workers to have a spare-time work of less than 15 hours per week, while the ILO 
counts workers with a job of at least 1 hour per week as employed.
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2.C Figures of the Time Aggregation Bias
Figure 2.C.1: Measures of transition rates
Notes:  Solid lines present the continuous measures, dashed lines the monthly point-in-time measures and dotted 
lines the adjusted monthly point-in-time measures. Time series show quarterly averages of monthly data.
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Figure 2.C.2: Absolute time aggregation bias
Note: Solid lines show the actual time aggregation bias and dashed lines the estimated time aggregation bias.
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Figure 2.C.3: Relative time aggregation bias
Notes:  Time aggregation bias over continuously measured transition rate. Solid lines show the actual time 
aggregation bias and dashed lines the estimated time aggregation bias.
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Figure 2.C.4: Coverage of correction approach
Note: Estimated time aggregation bias over actual time aggregation bias.
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2.D Robustness Checks
Table 2.D.1:  Descriptive statistics of time aggregation bias applying Shimer’s smoothing  
parameter
Job finding rate Separation rate 
Actual 
(1981–2007) 
Estimated 
(1981–2007) 
Actual 
(1981–2007) 
Estimated 
(1981–2007) 
Standard deviation 0.158 0.226 0.122 0.106 
Relative to total measures 1.317 1.883 1.341 1.165 
Autocorrelation 0.821 0.809 0.789 0.784 
Relative to total measures 1.002 0.988 1.021 1.014 
Notes:  Log deviations from HP trend with λ = 105. Total measures are the continuously measured transition rates.
Table 2.D.2:  Contributions to steady state unemployment fluctuations applying Shimer’s 
smoothing parameter
Job finding rate Separation rate 
Full 
sample 
(1981–2007) 
Reunified 
Germany 
(1993–2007) 
Full 
sample 
(1981–2007) 
Reunified 
Germany 
(1993–2007) 
Continuous measures 0.547 0.677 0.423 0.385 
Discrete measures 0.519 0.641 0.460 0.425 
Adjusted measures 0.530 0.657 0.447 0.412 
Note: Log deviations from HP trend with λ = 105. 
Table 2.D.3: Contributions to steady state unemployment fluctuations using first differences
Job finding rate Separation rate 
Full 
sample 
(1981–2007) 
Reunified 
Germany 
(1993–2007) 
Full 
sample 
(1981–2007) 
Reunified 
Germany 
(1993–2007) 
Continuous measures 0.556 0.485 0.430 0.467 
Discrete measures 0.574 0.500 0.405 0.439 
Adjusted measures 0.586 0.510 0.390 0.428 
Note: First differences of log variables. 
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Figure 2.D.1:  Cross correlations of time aggregation bias with business cycle indicators applying 
Shimer’s smoothing parameter
Notes:  Log deviations from HP trend with λ = 105. Solid lines show the actual time aggregation bias and ashed 
lines the estimated time aggregation bias. Measure i along the abscissa accounts for leads (positive 
values) and lags (negative values) at a quarterly frequency. Output measures gross domestic product (GDP). 
Labor productivity is the ratio of GDP to total hours worked.
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 (with Enzo Weber)
This paper provides a deeper insight into unemployment dynamics in Germany. 
Using a structural vectorautoregressive (SVAR) model, we identify the effects of a 
technology shock as well as two policy shocks. We find that the worker reallocation 
process varies substantially with the identified shocks. The job finding rate plays 
a larger role after a technology shock and a monetary policy shock, whereas the 
separation rate appears to be the dominant margin after a fiscal policy shock. 
Technology shocks turn out to be relatively important for variations in the transition 
rates, though they do not seem to trigger the high volatilities of German labor market 
variables. Considering policy shocks, our results point toward fiscal interventions as 
a promising instrument, but with several limitations.
3.1 Introduction
Unemployment dynamics receive substantial attention in business cycle research. 
Their net changes shape the adjustment of unemployment and are an important 
indicator of the economic situation. A high magnitude of unemployment dynamics, 
on the one hand, implies labor market flexibility but, on the other hand, creates 
considerable uncertainty.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the patterns of unemployment 
dynamics in Germany. The German case is attractive due to the availability of high-
quality data and its labor market development, which is significantly different 
from that of the U.S. The primary aim is to provide a deeper insight into the worker 
reallocation process, i.e. the flows in and out of unemployment. For this purpose, we 
employ a structural vectorautoregressive (SVAR) model and specify different shocks 
that are considered to play an important role for labor market fluctuations. These 
shocks include a technology shock, a monetary policy shock and a fiscal policy shock.1
In Germany, the number of unemployed workers fluctuates by approximately 
30,000 each month.2 The underlying worker flows are about 20 times larger and 
challenge both policymakers and theoretical approaches. Labeled as the Shimer 
(2005) puzzle, it is well-known that the empirical evidence on labor market 
fluctuations cannot be replicated by the canonical search and matching model. 
1 The choice of structural shocks is in line with Ravn and Simonelli (2008), who analyze the effects on labor market 
stock variables in the U.S. In contrast to Ravn and Simonelli (2008), however, we do not distinguish between 
neutral and investment-specific technology shocks because we focus on the extensive margin of labor adjustment. 
Investment-specific technology shocks have proven to explain a major part of the dynamics of the intensive 
margin, i.e. hours worked (see also Fisher, 2006). 
2 Average change after seasonal adjustment from 1991 to 2012. 
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Consequently, a number of studies have stated shortcomings of the standard 
model, most prominently the assumption of an exogenous separation rate.
Several studies demonstrate the relevance of both the job finding rate and 
the separation rate to account for country-specific unemployment fluctuations. 
However, those studies are mainly based on unconditional analyses that provide 
only an overall picture of the prevalent margin of unemployment changes. Therefore, 
more recent studies emphasize the importance of switching to conditional analyses 
on shocks (see, e.g., Canova et al., forthcoming; Balleer, 2012).
We disentangle different structural shocks to inspect whether the worker 
reallocation process depends on the underlying shock or whether it is constant 
across shocks. In addition, some studies criticize the focus on productivity shocks 
in the search and matching literature (see, e.g., Barnichon, 2007). Accordingly, we 
overcome the single-shock assumption and enrich the discussion on the sources of 
unemployment dynamics by specifying demand-side impulses. However, we do not 
model the whole demand side of the economy but evaluate the role of technology 
shocks under the consideration of two specific demand shocks, i.e. a monetary 
policy shock and a fiscal policy shock.
The analysis of a technology shock corresponds to the standard search and 
matching model where changes in productivity are seen as the central source of 
unemployment dynamics. The empirical evidence on unemployment responses, 
however, is ambiguous. For example, Canova et al. (forthcoming) find Schumpeterian 
features of neutral technology shocks in the U.S., i.e. unemployment increases after 
a positive technology shock. This observation clearly counters the traditional view 
in the search and matching literature in which positive technology shocks are 
assumed to reduce unemployment.
The analysis of policy shocks addresses the question of the usefulness of 
discretionary policy interventions for controlling unemployment dynamics. While 
the focus has often been on the effects of monetary policy, the interest in fiscal 
policy shocks has revived. The recent financial crisis has shown that using monetary 
policy measures is limited when interest rates are low. Despite wide skepticism 
about the effects of fiscal policy, it is argued that governments would have been 
better able to fight the crisis if they had been able to adopt a more expansionary 
fiscal stance (see Blanchard et al., 2010). In addition, for Germany as a member 
state of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), decisions on monetary 
policy are made on a supra-national level. Because those decisions may not 
necessarily reflect the domestic situation, fiscal policy may be more relevant for 
stabilizing national unemployment fluctuations.
Considering two specific demand shocks, our paper extends the study of 
Bachmann and Balleer (2011), who compare the effects of technology shocks 
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for the U.S. and Germany. Interestingly, the authors find significant cross-
country differences in the responses to a positive technology shock. In Germany, 
unemployment increases due to a rise in the separation rate, and in the U.S., 
unemployment increases due to a fall in the job finding rate. Accordingly, Bachmann 
and Balleer (2011) conclude that non-technology shocks, such as demand shocks, 
are necessary to understand the overall dynamics of unemployment.
Moreover, our analysis is related to several studies on the worker reallocation 
process in the U.S. For example, Braun et al. (2009) analyze the responses of 
labor market variables to different types of shocks. The authors find qualitatively 
similar results across shocks, where the responses of the job finding rate determine 
unemployment changes. Demand shocks induce less persistent effects compared to 
supply shocks, but the demand shocks appear to be more important. When directly 
comparing technology and monetary policy shocks, Braun et al. (2009) identify a 
higher contribution of monetary policy shocks. Also related to our study is that of 
Fujita (2011), who shows that a fast response of the separation rate and a hump-
shaped behavior of the job finding rate are robust features with respect to several 
specifications.
While the worker reallocation process in the U.S. seems to be independent of the 
underlying type of shock, our results show interesting differences for Germany. Most 
notably, the job finding rate is the prevalent margin after a technology shock and 
a monetary policy shock, while the separation rate appears to be the driving force 
after a fiscal policy shock. In addition, technology shocks are relatively important 
for variations in the transition rates, though they cannot explain the high volatilities 
in the German labor market. The consideration of policy shocks points toward fiscal 
interventions as a promising instrument for controlling unemployment dynamics. 
However, our analysis identifies also several limitations, such as a short-lived 
influence of government spending shocks. We argue that the persistence of shocks 
may be relevant when accounting for unemployment dynamics.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 describes our data on German 
worker flows. Section 3.3 outlines the empirical approach, including the model 
specification and the estimation procedure. The benchmark results are presented 
in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides several robustness checks regarding data issues 
and model assumptions. In Section 3.6, we investigate the subsample stability. The 
conclusion follows in Section 3.7.
3.2 Data Description
While we use official data to obtain the structural shocks of interest, we generate 
worker flows from the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB). The 
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SIAB is a 2% random sample of all German residents who are registered by the 
Federal Employment Agency for the administration of the unemployment insurance 
and benefit systems. In contrast to survey data, the administrative data face neither 
sample attrition nor sample rotation problems and provide the individuals’ labor 
market status on a daily basis, which is important to measure worker flows without 
a time aggregation bias.3 This information yields a considerable advantage over the 
commonly used U.S. data. 
Worker flows are calculated as the number of transitions between employment 
and unemployment within a month. Employment is measured as employment 
subject to social security and thus excludes, e.g., self-employment, apprenticeships 
or marginal jobs. Unemployment is measured by benefit receipt. Following 
Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010), we also correct for specific periods without benefit 
receipt that are likely to result from the expiration of entitlements or that may 
constitute times of sanctions.4
The worker flows are defined by their underlying transition hazard rates because 
these rates are interpreted as the driving forces of unemployment dynamics. 
Accordingly, the monthly job finding rate (f ) and separation rate (s) satisfy 
  (3.1)
where t denotes the 10th day of a month and S denotes the number of days since 
the 10th day of the previous month. To account for a structural break due to the 
German reunification, the time series are backward adjusted in 1993. The transition 
rates are then adjusted for seasonality and represented by their quarterly averages. 
The latter is necessary to obtain data at the same frequency as the official data that 
we use to specify the structural shocks.
Figure 3.1 shows the transition rates from 1981 to 2007. The job finding rate 
declines from over 10% to approximately 5%. Thus, the average unemployment 
duration between two socially secured jobs has increased from under 1 year to 
almost 2 years. This development, in turn, implies a substantial increase in long-term 
unemployment. According to our definition, the share of long-term unemployment 
accounts for around 50% after the reunification.5 The separation rate fluctuates 
around 1% throughout the sample period. Hence, a job that is subject to social 
3 Nordmeier (2012) analyzes monthly reversed worker flows in Germany and finds that point-in-time measurements 
underestimate both the level of worker flows and the flows’ cyclical movements. 
4 More details on data selection and measurement are given by Nordmeier (2012).
5 Obviously, this number is higher than the official numbers on long-term unemployment because our unemployment 
definition also includes workers who are marginally attached to the labor force.
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security lasts, on average, approximately 8 years. In addition, the transition rates 
display different movements on business cycle frequency. While the job finding rate 
adjusts quite gradually, the separation rate depicts relatively sharp variations. The 
latter holds, for example, for the drop in the late 1980s (which does not result from 
the statistical break at the German reunification).
Figure 3.1: Transition rates
Note: Quarterly averages of monthly data in %.
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(b) Separation rate
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3.3 Empirical Model
We employ a SVAR model to analyze macroeconomic fluctuations in a framework 
that requires a minimum of theoretical assumptions. Hence, this tool enables us 
to address several ongoing discussions concerning the sources and patterns of 
unemployment dynamics.
Our empirical approach proceeds as follows. First, we specify the VAR model and 
identify different structural shocks that are considered to play an important role 
for labor market dynamics. These shocks include a technology shock, a monetary 
policy shock and a fiscal policy shock. Then, we describe our estimation procedure 
and derive the conditional unemployment response.
3.3.1 VAR Specification
We consider the following reduced-form VAR model:
yt = μ+ A(L)yt−1 + νt  ,  (3.2)
where yt is a vector of the endogenous variables, μ denotes a vector of constants, 
A(L) is a lag polynomial of order p and νt captures the residuals. In our benchmark 
specification, the included variables are changes in government spending (Δgt ), 
changes in labor productivity (Δat ), the separation rate (st  ), the job finding rate (ft ) 
and the interest rate (rt ) (see Table 3.A.1 for exact definitions of the variables). The 
ordering of the variables may support the identifying restrictions toward a nearly 
triangular identification scheme.
The use of first differences follows from unit root tests that are presented in 
Table 3.A.2. The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test indicates a nonstationary 
behavior of government spending and productivity. However, we do not impose 
the nonstationarity assumption on the job finding and separation rates but leave 
it to the system estimation to identify a unit root or not. This approach has the 
advantage of allowing a flexible decision. In case of nonstationarity, the VAR model 
would still be consistently estimated (see, e.g., Sims et al., 1990).
3.3.2 Identification of Shocks
Because the innovations νt from a reduced-form VAR are typically correlated, 
interpreting them as structural shocks would be misleading. Therefore, we need to 
impose identifying restrictions on the reduced-form residuals, which allow us to 
disentangle structural shocks in the variables. To that end, we include a matrix B 
that relates the structural shocks to the reduced-form innovations
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νt = B εt ,  (3.3)
where εt ∼ (0, ∑ε ) summarizes the structural shocks and B describes the immediate 
effects of the shocks on the variables yt . The structural shocks are assumed to be 
orthogonal with unit variance, i.e. , following the convention in the 
literature.
Our aim is to provide evidence on unemployment dynamics in response to 
economically well-founded shocks. Therefore, we base our analysis on standard 
identifying restrictions. In doing so, we distinguish between long-run restrictions 
for the technology shock and short-run restrictions for the two policy shocks. 
Short-run restrictions contain assumptions about contemporaneous relations 
between shocks and variables and are thus imposed on matrix B. In contrast, long-
run restrictions are imposed on the impulse responses (see Appendix 3.B).
The technology shock εa is identified as a neutral technology shock. According 
to Gali (1999), we allow only technology shocks to have a permanent impact 
on productivity. Thus, we assume that the unit root in productivity exclusively 
results from technology shocks and that the long-run effects of all other shocks 
are zero. However, other shocks can affect productivity temporarily through its 
interdependency with policy and labor market variables. Such transitory impacts 
can be quite substantial.
The identification of the monetary shock εr follows Christiano et al. (1996). 
Accordingly, the monetary authority can react to other structural shocks 
immediately; however, the intervention works only with a one-period time lag. 
Hence, the monetary shock cannot influence other variables within the same 
period. We further assume that the monetary authority has a direct influence on 
the interbank money market rate.
The fiscal policy shock describes a shock in government spending. Following 
Blanchard and Perotti (2002), we identify the government spending shock εg by 
assuming that the government reacts to other shocks only with a one-quarter 
implementation lag. Hence, government spending depends on its own history and 
on lagged values of other variables but not on unexpected movements in any other 
variable. Put differently, government spending is predetermined.
3.3.3 Estimation
The combination of short- and long-run restrictions leads to a non-recursive 
structure in our SVAR model and thus prevents an ordinary least square estimation. 
Therefore, we estimate our model with the maximum likelihood (ML) method using 
the Newton algorithm.
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After we obtain the results of the ML estimation, we apply a residual-based 
bootstrap procedure and run 1,000 replications to compute confidence intervals 
for the impulse response functions. We also adopt the median from the empirical 
bootstrap distribution because the point estimates may be biased in small samples 
(compare also Canova et al., forthcoming).
Given the bootstrapped impulse responses of the transition rates, we follow 
Fujita (2011) and trace the unemployment response based on the law of motion. In 
general, a change in unemployment is given by the sum of its in- and outflows. In 
our two-state environment, the unemployment response satisfies 
  (3.4)
where ,  denote the conditional transition rates and et = (1 – ut ).
The starting point of the law of motion is the steady state unemployment rate: 
  (3.5)
where ,  indicate the sample average of the transition rates.
The conditional developments of the job finding and separation rates are 
received by transforming their impulse responses into levels: 
  (3.6)
where the sample averages ,  again represent the baseline value and  
describes the structural shock of interest.
This procedure neglects any flows in and out of the labor force and thus 
provides the pure response of the unemployment rate that arises from the worker 
reallocation process within the labor force.
3.4 Results
Our benchmark results are based on a lag order of p = 2. The choice of the lag order 
follows different selection criteria (see Table 3.A.3). Considering the variation 
along with the maximum number of lags, the chosen lag structure satisfies most 
criteria.
In what follows, we present the conditional worker reallocation process and the 
corresponding unemployment adjustment as obtained by the impulse responses. 
Subsequently, we decompose the variance of the forecast errors and discuss the 
importance of the different shocks for the transition rates.
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3.4.1 Impulse Responses
Impulse responses illustrate the dynamic reaction of a variable to a structural 
shock. The impulses are normalized to a unit increase in the underlying variable. 
The responses of the labor market variables are presented in percentage points; 
Table 3.A.4 gives the steady state values.
Technology shock. Figure 3.2 shows the dynamic responses to a technology 
shock. A positive technology shock leads to an increase in the job finding rate 
and a decline in the separation rate. Accordingly, the unemployment rate goes 
down. The response of the job finding rate is significant for 4 quarters, while the 
response of the separation rate is borderline significant. Hence, the technology 
shock appears to work primarily along the job finding margin. This observation 
corresponds to the standard setup of the search and matching model, where 
the transmission mechanism of a productivity change is modeled by a matching 
function.6 Nevertheless, the separation rate does demonstrate a reaction that 
supports the postulation of an endogenous separation margin in theoretical 
approaches.
The reduction in the unemployment rate is in line with the traditional view of 
the Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory, which has strongly influenced the search 
and matching model.7 A positive productivity shock raises the expected profits 
from a match such that firms will post more vacancies. Because unemployment 
is predetermined, the rise in vacancies leads to a higher market tightness and, 
according to the matching function, a higher job finding rate. The higher job finding 
rate, in turn, reduces unemployment. The fall in unemployment then counters the 
increased job finding rate via the matching function in subsequent periods. In 
general, the variables adjust gradually to the steady state after a one-off increase 
in productivity.
In terms of magnitude, the unemployment rate shows a relatively resilient 
response. A one percent increase in productivity leads to a 0.07 percentage point 
reduction of unemployment, which is 0.5% of the baseline value. In contrast, 
the transition rates react more sensitively to a technology shock. The impact 
effects amount to 5.4% in case of the job finding rate and to 2.8% in case of 
the separation rate.8 Considering that a one percent increase in productivity is of
6 Under standard assumptions, the job finding rate is a function of labor market tightness. 
7 See, e.g., Merz (1995) for an integration of the search and matching approach in an RBC model.
8 Gartner et al. (2012) explain the high volatility of German worker flows by large hiring costs and low quit rates. 
Using a labor selection model with worker-firm specific productivity shocks, the authors demonstrate that those 
factors depress the level of the transition rates and thereby increase their sensitivity to aggregate shocks. 
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Figure 3.2: Responses to a technology shock
Notes:  Impulse responses to a one-off increase in productivity. The abscissa accounts for the quarters after an 
impulse. The black line shows the median from bootstrapping, and the grey area demonstrates the 90% 
confidence interval. Benchmark sample: 1981–2007.
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plausible magnitude,9 the technology shock fails to account for the unconditional 
volatilities on the German labor market. This observation, in turn, reinforces the 
critique on the single-shock assumption when analyzing unemployment dynamics.
Monetary policy shock. Figure 3.3 presents the dynamic adjustment process 
after a contractionary monetary policy shock. The monetary impulse triggers 
hump-shaped responses in the job finding rate and the unemployment rate. 
The job finding rate decreases significantly after 4 to 9 quarters in response 
to a rise in the interest rate, and it then adjusts gradually to the steady state. 
The behavior of the unemployment rate mirrors the response of the job finding 
rate, though it is slightly smoothed by the reaction of the separation rate. The 
separation rate responds with a temporary drop and increases after 6 quarters, 
according to the contractionary impulse. The influence on the separation 
rate, however, is low and insignificant. Consequently, a monetary policy shock 
appears to be transmitted to unemployment through its impact on the job 
finding rate.
A hump-shaped pattern after a monetary policy shock has been documented 
in several studies. Interestingly, the velocity of the adjustment process appears 
to depend on the underlying labor market structure. For example, Islas-Camargo 
and Cortez (2011) observe a maximum effect of monetary policy shocks on 
Mexican unemployment after only 3 quarters. The authors explain this result 
by the existence of a large informal sector and schemes that have led to more 
employment flexibility. In contrast, Ravn and Simonelli (2008) find a peak effect 
on U.S. unemployment after 6 quarters, and Alexius and Holmlund (2008) report 
a maximum increase in Swedish unemployment after 9 quarters. Our results for 
Germany show a peak effect on unemployment after 7 quarters. Accordingly, the 
degree of labor market regulation tends to increase the persistence of responses to 
monetary policy shocks.
The effects of a monetary policy shock are smaller than those of a productivity 
shock. A unit increase in the interest rate leads to a maximum reduction in the 
job finding rate by around 0.26 percentage points, which corresponds to 4.2% of 
its baseline value. The maximum increase in the unemployment rate amounts to 
0.03 percentage points, which is half the impact effect of the technology shock. 
Considering that the changes in key interest rates are about 0.25–0.5 percentage 
points, the effects appear even smaller.
9 A one percent increase in productivity resembles the standard deviation of its cyclical component. For example, 
Gartner et al. (2012) report a standard deviation of 1.3% by computing the log deviation from the HP trend with 
λ   = 105. Using the standard smoothing parameter of λ = 1,600, we observe a standard deviation of 0.7%. 
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Figure 3.3: Responses to a monetary policy shock
Notes:  Impulse responses to a one-off increase in the interest rate. The abscissa accounts for the quarters after 
an impulse. The black line shows the median from bootstrapping, and the grey area demonstrates the 90% 
confidence interval. Benchmark sample: 1981–2007.
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Fiscal policy shock. The effects of a fiscal policy shock are plotted in Figure  3.4. 
In the impact period, the variables show the expected reactions to a rise in 
government spending. The job finding rate goes up, the separation rate goes down 
and, as a result, the unemployment rate shrinks. Interestingly, the job finding 
rate decreases after the positive impact effect, and then returns sluggishly to its 
baseline value. At first glance, the negative side effect might indicate a Ricardian 
behavior; thus, the general skepticism about the effects of fiscal policy. Based on 
Ricardian equivalence arguments, the increase in government spending is likely to 
lead to a future rise in distorting taxes and thereby to lower profits. In turn, firms 
will reduce their labor demand, and the job finding rate will decrease. However, 
the negative effect on the job finding rate is rather borderline insignificant and 
should not be overstated.
Except for the negative side effect on the job finding rate, the government 
spending shock tends to have a short-lived influence only. Nevertheless, a rapid 
adjustment process after a fiscal policy shock appears to be characteristic for 
Germany. For example, Bode et al. (2006), Tenhofen et al. (2010) and Baum and 
Koester (2001) show short-run effects of both government spending and revenue 
shocks on German GDP. Instead, Ravn and Simonelli (2008) document rather hump-
shaped effects of a fiscal policy shock on U.S. output and labor market variables, 
with peak effects observed after 3 years.
Because the positive impact effect on the job finding rate is insignificant, 
the fall in the unemployment rate can be mainly ascribed to the separation 
margin. This observation, however, challenges the conclusion of Turrini (2012). 
For highly regulated labor markets in OECD countries, Turrini (2012) reports a 
dominant role of the job finding rate after a fiscal policy shock.10 Thus, the result 
of Turrini (2012) implies that a fiscal policy shock tends to influence the average 
unemployment duration. Our result implies an impact on job stability, though 
Germany has a relatively strict employment protection. However, when firms 
are aware of the vanishing character of fiscal stimulus, search frictions may 
hinder a temporarily capacity extension along the job finding margin and fixed-
term contracts may help to overcome employment protection after a negative 
impulse.
10 Turrini (2012) uses an action-based variable on fiscal consolidation. Because this measure does not include cyclical 
movements, it can be considered as exogenous. 
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Figure 3.4: Responses to a fiscal policy shock
Notes:  Impulse responses to a one-off increase in government spending. The abscissa accounts for the quarters 
after an impulse. The black line shows the median from bootstrapping, and the grey area demonstrates the 
90% confidence interval. Benchmark sample: 1981-2007.
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The size of the responses underpins the dominant role of the separation rate. On 
impact, a one percent increase in government spending reduces the separation 
rate by 0.013 percentage points and 1.2% of its baseline value. In contrast, the 
government spending shock raises the job finding rate by 0.4 percentage points, 
which corresponds to 0.6% of the sample average. The government spending shock, 
thus, can generate a small amplification effect on the separation rate but not on the 
job finding rate. The impact multiplier with respect to unemployment is only 0.1.11
To sum up, the transmission channel to unemployment responses varies 
significantly with the identified shocks. The job finding rate turns out to be the 
driving force of unemployment responses after a technology shock and a monetary 
policy shock, whereas the separation rate appears to be the dominant margin in 
case of a fiscal policy shock. Differences occur also in the timing and the velocity 
of the adjustment process. The effects of the technology shock emerge on impact 
and remain significant for over 1 year. In contrast, the monetary policy shock 
reaches its peak effect after 1.5 years, while the influence of a fiscal policy shock 
vanishes rapidly. These patterns indeed can be reconciled with the stylized fact 
that fluctuations of the job finding rate are more persistent than those of the 
separation rate.
3.4.2 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition
The variance decomposition of the forecast errors reveals the relevance of 
the shocks for movements in the different variables. This composition provides 
information over and above impulse responses, which display dynamic reactions to 
hypothetical shocks. The interpretation of the variance decomposition, however, is 
restricted to the relative importance of the identified shocks because the forecast 
errors depend substantially on the underlying VAR system.
Table 3.1 gives the proportions of variations in the transition rates due to 
the different structural shocks. It can be seen that the three shocks account for 
approximately 40% of the forecast error variance in the job finding rate and 
approximately 30% of the forecast error variance in the separation rate.12 Thereby, 
the technology shock plays a prevailing role. However, the relative contribution of 
the technology shock compared to the two policy shocks diverges over time.
For the job finding rate, the technology shock shows a maximum contribution 
of 41% after 4 periods and then decreases to 32% over the 5-year forecast horizon. 
11 The returned interest in fiscal policy has also revived the debate on fiscal multipliers. Monacelli et al. (2010) analyze 
fiscal multipliers with respect to labor market variables and demonstrate that wage rigidity may dampen the size 
of unemployment multipliers. 
12 The difference to unity captures the contributions of exogenous disturbances in the transition rates themselves.
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At the same time, the contributions of both policy shocks increase. In particular, 
the monetary policy shock explains up to 8%. The different developments can be 
related to the different shapes of the impulse responses. While the technology 
shock has its maximum effect on impact, the monetary policy shock reaches its 
peak effect on the job finding rate only after around 1.5 years. Accordingly, the 
cumulative effect of the monetary policy shock arises in longer forecast horizons. 
The fiscal policy shock accounts for about 6% in the long run.
Table 3.1: Forecast error variance decomposition
Job finding rate Separation rate 
Forecast 
horizon 
Technology 
shock 
Monetary 
shock 
Fiscal 
shock 
Technology 
shock 
Monetary 
shock 
Fiscal 
shock 
1 0.365 0.000 0.022 0.120 0.000 0.103 
2 0.388 0.012 0.048 0.227 0.003 0.065 
3 0.403 0.020 0.047 0.239 0.005 0.052 
4 0.406 0.030 0.044 0.251 0.006 0.048 
5 0.402 0.038 0.047 0.260 0.006 0.045 
6 0.394 0.046 0.048 0.266 0.006 0.043 
7 0.386 0.053 0.049 0.269 0.006 0.042 
8 0.377 0.058 0.051 0.271 0.006 0.041 
9 0.369 0.063 0.052 0.273 0.006 0.041 
10 0.361 0.066 0.053 0.274 0.007 0.041 
11 0.354 0.070 0.054 0.275 0.007 0.040 
12 0.347 0.072 0.054 0.275 0.008 0.040 
13 0.342 0.074 0.055 0.275 0.009 0.040 
14 0.336 0.076 0.055 0.275 0.009 0.040 
15 0.332 0.077 0.056 0.275 0.010 0.040 
16 0.328 0.078 0.056 0.275 0.010 0.040 
17 0.324 0.079 0.056 0.275 0.010 0.040 
18 0.321 0.079 0.057 0.275 0.010 0.040 
19 0.319 0.080 0.057 0.275 0.010 0.040 
20 0.316 0.080 0.057 0.275 0.010 0.040 
Note: Based on medians from bootstrapping. 
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In contrast, the importance of the technology shock for movements in the 
separation rate increases steadily in shorter forecast horizons and then remains 
nearly unchanged. The monetary policy shock hardly contributes to fluctuations in 
the separation rate, while the fiscal policy shock matters in the short run due to its 
sharp impact effect. In the first forecast period, the fiscal policy shock is nearly as 
important as the technology shock.
3.4.3 Discussion
Our results show that the worker reallocation process in Germany does not 
proceed independently from the underlying type of shock. In particular, the impulse 
responses indicate that the significance of the transition rates varies with the 
identified innovations. The forecast error variance decomposition exhibits the 
different adjustment processes through a changing relevance of the structural 
shocks over time. This observation might suggest a role for the persistence of 
shocks to understand the conditional patterns of unemployment dynamics.
Figure 3.5 shows the impulse responses of productivity, interest rate and 
government spending to their own shocks. The impulse responses are equivalent 
to the movements of the variables conditional on the individual shocks. Indeed, 
these movements differ substantially in the degree of persistence.13 The adjustment 
process is finished rather quickly for government spending. Compared to that, 
productivity adjusts with moderate persistence, and the adjustment of the interest 
13 We call a process persistent if it takes a long time to reach a new steady state.
Figure 3.5: Adjustment mechanisms
Note:  The solid line shows the adjustment of productivity, the dashed line the adjustment of the interest rate and 
the dotted line the adjustment of government spending.
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rate takes the most time. The impression of a differing persistence in the adjustment 
mechanisms is supported by the coefficients for the first-order autocorrelation of 
the conditional movements (see Table 3.A.5).
Moreover, Table 3.A.5 provides the correlations between those variables and 
the transition rates based on the different shocks. Interestingly, the separation rate 
shows constantly higher cross-correlations in absolute values than the job finding 
rate, indicating that the separation margin is more sensitive to contemporaneous 
changes. Nevertheless, those contemporaneous relations are less significant in the 
cases of a technology shock and of a monetary policy shock, which induce more 
persistent patterns.
In fact, several authors emphasize the role of persistence for the dynamic 
responses of labor market variables. For example, Mayer et al. (2010) and Kato 
and Miyamoto (2013) demonstrate that the degree of persistence of government 
spending shocks strongly influences the response of unemployment. Mayer et al. 
(2010) find that the sign of the unemployment response changes when they assume 
a serially uncorrelated shock. Kato and Miyamoto (2013) explicitly incorporate an 
endogenous role of the separation margin and show higher impact multipliers than 
by assuming an exogenous separation rate; however, the authors also find that 
the magnitude of labor market responses decreases the less persistent government 
spending shocks are. Moreover, a lower persistence of government spending shocks 
accelerates a negative side effect on the job finding rate.
Recall that the worker reallocation process in the U.S. has been found to be 
similar across shocks. Here, the hump-shaped behavior of the job finding rate 
dominates the sharp responses of the separation rate, which, in turn, explains the 
conditional patterns of labor market stock variables (see Braun et al., 2009; Fujita, 
2011; Ravn and Simonelli, 2008). Accordingly, our results may suggest that shocks 
in the U.S. tend to trigger more persistent adjustment mechanisms than in Germany 
and that differences in the reactions to specific shocks are less pronounced.
3.5 Robustness Analysis
This section reconsiders the foregoing results along the following dimensions. First, 
we address some data issues, such as the indicated nonstationarity of the transition 
rates and their trending behavior. Then, we proceed by modifying the lag length and 
inspect the identifying assumptions. Afterwards, we examine technology shocks in 
a small VAR model, as was performed in previous studies.
Unit Roots. When variables appear to be integrated, it is not necessary to impose 
the unit root because the estimation of a nonstationary VAR model yields consistent 
parameters. For an incorrect restriction, the model would be misspecified, and the 
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estimation results are likely to be biased. However, if the restriction is correct, the 
estimation would gain more efficient parameters.
Because the ADF test cannot reject the null hypothesis of nonstationarity for 
the job finding rate, we check our results by including the job finding rate in first 
differences. We also assume a unit root in the separation rate, though the null 
hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level. Nevertheless, redoing the 
unit root test by allowing for a higher lag structure, as assumed in the VAR model, 
points more to an integrated separation rate.14
The results show only slight changes. After a technology shock, the responses of 
the job finding rate and unemployment rate are less significant. The response of the 
separation rate to a contractionary monetary policy shock turns out strictly positive, 
though still insignificant. Accordingly, the unemployment response becomes more 
significant after the monetary policy shock. These changes, however, do not affect 
the implications of our benchmark estimation.
Structural Break. Although the transition rates have been adjusted for 
the German reunification, the striking movement in the early 1990s requires 
investigating their trend behavior. A closer look at the development of the 
German Beveridge curve reveals a substantial right shift in 1991 because many 
workers became unemployed when Eastern Germany was transformed toward a 
market economy (see Klinger and Weber, 2012). If a significant number of those 
workers moved to the Western part to enhance their reemployment probability, 
the registration at Western German employment agencies would indeed trigger a 
downward shift in the Western German job finding rate.
A Chow test indicates a structural break in the job finding rate in 1991Q3. 
Once we include a shift dummy for the job finding rate, we obtain lower and less 
persistent impulse responses. However, the signs and shapes of the benchmark 
results appear to be robust. In addition, the changes are countered if we also 
consider a shift dummy for the separation rate, as suggested by the Chow test.
Cyclical Components. An alternative procedure to treat low-frequency 
movements is to use a detrending method. In particular, Fernald (2007) 
demonstrates that VARs with long-run restrictions are sensitive to low frequencies. 
Even if low-frequency movements do not reflect a unit root, they can be 
problematic. Therefore, Fernald (2007) recommends verifying the results using 
alternative detrending methods.
Particularly the job finding rate displays a notable trend behavior. In the first 
part of our sample period, the job finding rate exhibits a reduction of more than 
one half of its initial value in 1981. In general, labor market dynamics may decline 
14 Further evidence comes from Klinger and Weber (2012). 
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for several reasons. For example, changes in the composition of the labor force, 
such as aging, are a prominent explanation.15 Other explanations include a fall in 
outside wage offers or a rise in mobility costs.
Against the background of the debate initiated by Shimer (2005), we use the 
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter to remove the trending behavior in the transition 
rates.16 This specification of the transition rates may be interpreted as the 
underlying business cycle component.17 The general pattern of our benchmark 
results is unchanged. Interestingly, the responses to a technology shock become 
insignificant, whereas the positive impact effect of the government spending shock 
on the job finding rate turns out to be significant. This result might indicate that 
technology shocks are more important for low-frequency movements and that 
government spending shocks rather affect high-frequency variations, which could 
be a valuable path for future research. Moreover, the negative side effect of the 
fiscal policy shock on the job finding rate nearly disappears.
Lag Length. We also reestimate our benchmark model with a higher lag length 
of p = 4, as suggested by three selection criteria.
Allowing for a more complex adjustment process leads to more persistent 
responses with slightly lower impact effects. In general, the responses are less 
significant (which is not surprising in view of the higher number of parameters), 
and the negative response of the job finding rate to a government spending shock 
again turns out less pronounced. Nevertheless, the key results remain unchanged.
Identifying Assumptions. So far, we have assumed that government spending 
does not react contemporaneously to unexpected changes in any other variable. 
This assumption is convincing as long as the government spending measure does 
not include transfer payments, such as unemployment benefits. Nevertheless, the 
government spending measure may capture other unemployment-related subsidies 
that are counted as public consumption.
In 2011, for example, the unemployment-related government consumption 
amounted to 4.39 billion euro, i.e. approximately 0.9% of overall government 
consumption.18 Therefore, we relax our assumption and allow for non-zero effects 
of exogenous disturbances in the transition rates. Accordingly, innovations in 
government spending result as 
  (3.7)
15 However, Fujita (2012) shows for the U.S. separation rate that aging cannot account for the whole decline that has 
been observed for over three decades.
16 We use the standard smoothing parameter of λ = 1,600 for quarterly data. 
17 See Cogley and Nason (1995) for a critical view on the HP filter. These authors argue that the HP filter can generate 
a spurious cycle if a time series is integrated. 
18 See Statistisches Bundesamt (2012). 
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where b13 and b14 denote the automatic responses to shocks in the transition rates. 
At the same time, this modification leads to an exact identification of our VAR model 
and thus reconsiders the overidentification issue in our benchmark specification. 
However, the responses of our benchmark estimation are unchanged because the 
modified assumption primarily affects the shocks in the transition rates.
Small VAR. To relate our results to previous evidence, we also reestimate our 
VAR model by identifying a productivity shock only, i.e. yt = [at, st, ft ]’. Accordingly, we 
must impose two long-run restrictions to identify the technology shock and one 
short-run restriction to disentangle the innovations in the transition rates. Hence, 
this specification also satisfies an exact identification.
The results show that our benchmark estimation is robust with respect to the 
technology shock. In particular, the signs and magnitude of the impulse responses 
do not change once we exclude other variables. However, the full specification 
gives a more comprehensive picture of the sources of unemployment dynamics.
3.6 Subsample Analysis
In this section, we investigate the subsample stability of the preceding results. 
We follow the natural break along with the German reunification. Our data are 
complete for all of Germany since 1993; thus, we consider the time period from 
1993 to 2007. The impulse responses are plotted in Figures 3.A.1–3.A.3.
It can be seen that the responses change notably. In particular, the responses 
to a technology shock change their sign. The job finding rate shows a negative 
response to a positive technology shock. Interestingly, this effect has also been 
found for the U.S. labor market. Balleer (2012) explains the “job finding puzzle” 
by skill-biased technological change. Because a positive technology shock may 
increase the relative productivity of high-skilled to low-skilled workers, low-
skilled workers will be substituted out of employment. Accordingly, the job finding 
rate of low-skilled workers decreases, while the job finding rate of high-skilled 
workers may increase. Then, if the negative effect outweighs the positive effect, 
the aggregate job finding rate will decrease.
Indeed, the argumentation along with a substitution of low-skilled workers can 
be reconciled with the initial rise in the separation rate. In terms of the Schumpeterian 
paradigm, new technologies can cause a wave of creative destruction when 
existing jobs do not satisfy the new standards. The positive impact effect on the 
separation rate is also in line with recent evidence for the U.S. In particular, Canova 
et al. (forthcoming) discuss the Schumpeterian creative destruction hypothesis for 
neutral technology shocks and argue that search frictions can trigger a temporary 
rise in unemployment. This explanation appears to match our results. After the 
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impact period, however, the responses of the transition rates offset each other and 
the unemployment rate adjusts to the steady state.19
The insignificance of the responses may result not only from fewer observations 
but also from different features of a technology shock; i.e. traditional and 
Schumpeterian responses offset each other. In addition, the forecast error variance 
decomposition indicates that technology shocks per se have become less important 
after the reunification (see Table 3.A.6). Compared to our benchmark period, 
the relative importance of the technology shock shrinks for fluctuations in both 
transition rates. In short forecast horizons, the relative contribution accounts for 
up to 30% for the job finding rate and 19% for the separation rate. In longer 
forecast horizons, the contributions decrease to 26% and 16%, respectively. In 
relation to the policy shocks, however, the technology shock still plays a prevailing 
role, particularly for the job finding rate.
The monetary policy shock contributes only around 1% to the variation in the 
transition rates. Moreover, the responses to a monetary policy shock are low and 
insignificant. Particularly the impact on the unemployment rate is close to zero as 
both transition rates respond negatively. The disappearing relevance of monetary 
policy shocks for German unemployment dynamics might be traced back to the 
implementation of the EMU. It seems that the national labor market has become 
more resilient to monetary policy shocks. At the same time, monetary policy shocks 
have become less important to control unemployment dynamics.
In turn, the fiscal policy shock gains in importance. The contributions to 
the forecast errors increase by a factor of about 2–3. The shock again shows a 
significant impact effect on the unemployment rate through the separation margin. 
The response of the job finding rate, however, turns out strictly positive, indicating 
that the negative side effect of preceding results is not stable. In addition, the 
impact multipliers with respect to both transition rates increase. Considering the 
baseline values for the subsample, a one percent increase in government spending 
raises the job finding rate by 1.1% and reduces the separation rate by 1.8%. The 
fiscal multiplier with respect to unemployment is again around 0.1%.
3.7 Conclusion
Using a structural VAR approach, this paper has analyzed the conditional patterns 
of unemployment dynamics in Germany. For this purpose, we have specified a 
technology shock, a monetary policy shock and a fiscal policy shock.
19 These patterns seem to mirror the economic development in the 1990s. See also Smolny (2012) who describes the 
macroeconomic adjustment after the reunification. 
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Our analysis reveals various patterns of unemployment dynamics; i.e. the worker 
reallocation process is not constant across the identified shocks. In particular, the 
significance of the transition rates varies with the different types of shocks. The 
impulse responses indicate a larger role of the job finding rate after a technology 
shock and a monetary policy shock, while the separation rate appears to be the 
dominant margin after a fiscal policy shock. In line with the unconditional 
movements of the transition rates, the transmission mechanism through the job 
finding margin is relatively persistent, while the effects along the separation margin 
are sharp and short-lived. Several robustness checks reinforce this clear-cut pattern.
The forecast error variance decomposition demonstrates that the identified 
shocks account for 40% of the variations in the job finding rate and 30% of the 
variations in the separation rate. Thereby, the technology shock plays a substantial 
role. In our benchmark sample, the technology shock shows traditional features, 
i.e. an increase in productivity reduces unemployment. When we restrict our 
time period to reunified Germany, we also observe Schumpeterian features, i.e. 
an increase in productivity leads to higher separations. In addition, the relative 
importance of technology shocks shrinks over time.
Monetary policy shocks seem to have become less important for unemployment 
dynamics in Germany. Particularly after the reunification, changes in the interest 
rate account for only 1% of the variations in the transition rates. The loss of 
importance can be reconciled with the implementation of the EMU. Nevertheless, 
it should be noted that those results do not concern the functioning of rule-
based monetary interventions. Accordingly, the results may also indicate that the 
monetary authority does rarely deviate from its policy rule or that discretionary 
policy interventions are anticipated due to a transparent strategy.
Instead, fiscal policy shocks may be a more promising instrument to account 
for unemployment dynamics. The effects of the government spending shock are 
significant for different specifications, and the fiscal multipliers of the transition rates 
have increased over time. However, our analysis also indicates several limitations. First, 
the effects of a government spending shock turn out to be very short-lived. Second, 
there are indications of a Ricardian equivalence behavior, though this observation is 
not stable. Third, the fiscal multipliers are of a moderate magnitude, which might fuel 
concerns about fiscal debt levels. Forth, the transmission of a government spending 
shock works primarily through the separation rate; thus, fiscal policy may be less 
suitable to control rises in long-term unemployment triggered by other factors.
Hence, further evidence on the sources and mechanisms of labor market 
dynamics seems to be crucial for determining an optimal policy instrument. A key 
result from our study is that those analyses should not neglect the separation 
margin, particularly when shocks tend to be less persistent.
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3.A Further Tables and Figures
Table 3.A.1: Sources and definitions of data
Time series Definition Source 
Government spending Sum of government consumption and 
government gross fixed capital formation divided 
by output deflator (2000 = 100), logged 
National accounts 
Labor productivity Real gross domestic product (GDP) divided by 
total hours worked (2000 = 100), logged 
National accounts 
Job finding rate Transition rate from unemployment to 
employment (average of monthly rates based on 
daily transitions) 
SIAB 
Separation rate Transition rate from employment to 
unemployment (average of monthly rates based 
on daily transitions) 
SIAB 
Interest rate Nominal interbank money market rate (average 
of daily rates) 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Notes:  All series are seasonally adjusted using quarterly data. Western German data are linked to 
reunified German data in 1993.
Table 3.A.2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
Level First difference 
Model 
specification 
Test 
statistic 
Model 
specification 
Test 
statistic 
Government spending t, c, L = 4 -1.707 c, L = 3 -4.201*** 
Productivity t, c, L = 4 -2.293 c, L = 3 -4.452*** 
Separation rate c, L = 0 -3.031** L = 0 -12.062*** 
Job finding rate c, L = 1 -2.157 L = 0 -13.688*** 
Interest rate c, L = 1 -3.771*** L = 0 -5.277*** 
Notes:  The ADF regressions cover a number of lags (L) according to the Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information 
criteria. Regressions may include a trend (t ) and/or a constant (c). ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels.
Table 3.A.3: VAR lag order selection
Selection criteria 
Maximum  
lag length 
LR FPE AIC SIC HQ 
2 2 2 2 1 1 
4 4 4 4 1 1 
6 4 2 4 1 2 
8 4 2 2 1 1 
10 4 2 2 1 1 
12 4 2 12 1 1 
Note:  LR = Likelihood ratio test statistic, FPE = Final prediction error, AIC = Akaike information criterion, 
SIC = Schwarz information criterion, HQ = Hannan-Quinn information criterion. 
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Table 3.A.4: Steady state values
Benchmark sample Subsample 
(1981–2007) (1993–2007) 
Job finding rate 6.247 4.960 
Separation rate 1.036 1.056 
Unemployment rate 14.225 17.553 
Note: Values are based on the sample averages of the transition rates. 
Table 3.A.5: Conditional correlations
Productivity Interest rate Gov. spending 
Autocorrelation 0.718 0.917 -0.005 
Correlation f -0.705 -0.291 0.823 
matrix s 0.796 -0.862 -0.966 
Notes:  Based on medians from bootstrapping. The first column refers to the technology shock, the second column 
to the monetary policy shock and the last column to the fiscal policy shock. 
Table 3.A.6: Forecast error variance decomposition in the subsample (1993–2007)
Job finding rate Separation rate 
Forecast 
horizon 
Technology 
shock 
Monetary 
shock 
Fiscal 
shock 
Technology 
shock 
Monetary 
shock 
Fiscal 
shock 
1 0.300 0.000 0.076 0.192 0.000 0.210 
2 0.265 0.004 0.071 0.142 0.001 0.171 
3 0.294 0.005 0.087 0.147 0.004 0.143 
4 0.294 0.007 0.099 0.149 0.009 0.142 
5 0.289 0.007 0.100 0.149 0.011 0.141 
6 0.281 0.007 0.103 0.152 0.012 0.138 
7 0.276 0.007 0.106 0.154 0.013 0.137 
8 0.272 0.007 0.106 0.154 0.014 0.137 
9 0.269 0.007 0.107 0.155 0.014 0.136 
10 0.267 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
11 0.265 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
12 0.264 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
13 0.263 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
14 0.263 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
15 0.262 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
16 0.262 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
17 0.262 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
18 0.262 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
19 0.262 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
20 0.262 0.007 0.107 0.156 0.014 0.136 
Note: Based on medians from bootstrapping. 
IAB-Bibliothek 34680
Patterns of Unemployment Dynamics in Germany
Figure 3.A.1: Responses to a technology shock in the subsample (1993-2007) 
Notes:  Impulse responses to a one-off increase in productivity. Dotted lines refer to the benchmark period  
(1981–2007).
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Figure 3.A.2: Responses to a monetary policy shock in the subsample (1993-2007)
Notes:  Impulse responses to a one-off increase in the interest rate. Dotted lines refer to the benchmark period 
(1981–2007).
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Figure 3.A.3: Responses to a fiscal policy shock in the subsample (1993-2007)
Notes:  Impulse responses to a one-off increase in government spending. Dotted lines refer to the benchmark 
period (1981–2007).
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3.B Imposing Identifying Restrictions
One way to demonstrate the relation between the endogenous variables yt and the 
residuals  is using the Wold moving average (WMA) representation 
  (3.8)
where the  capture the responses to an impulse i periods ago. Substituting 
Equation 3.3 gives the link to the structural shocks 
  (3.9)
The sum of the impulse responses  derives as follows: 
 (3.10)
Then, the accumulated long-run effect of a structural shock is equal to 
  (3.11)
The latter expression demonstrates the interdependence of the matrices B and Φ 
and thus the link of short- and long-run restrictions.
Given our identifying assumptions, the matrices B and Φ take the form 
  (3.12)
and 
.  (3.13)
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4  The Matching Function: A Selection-Based 
Interpretation (with Britta Kohlbrecher and Christian Merkl)
This paper reconsiders the matching function. In a first step, we estimate an 
aggregate matching function with German administrative data. Our results 
provide renewed evidence for a Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant 
returns to scale. Relying on restricted matching elasticities, we further show that 
it is important to control for heterogeneity in the aggregate job finding rate. In a 
second step, we derive a simple labor selection model where vacancies do not have 
any aggregate effects, but appear as a worker attraction device. When we simulate 
this model for the German economy and estimate a matching function from the 
generated data, we also obtain evidence for a Cobb-Douglas function with constant 
returns to scale. In this fictional matching function, the elasticity of matches with 
respect to vacancies is a function of the exogenous contact probability. Thus, our 
paper suggests that the empirical evidence of the matching function may have a 
completely different interpretation.
4.1 Introduction
The matching function has become a very popular tool in labor market economics 
(see, e.g., Pissarides, 2000; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994) because it allows to 
model labor market frictions (i.e. the costly and time-consuming search and matching 
process) in a tractable way. The matching function is not only theoretically helpful 
but also empirically relevant (see Blanchard and Diamond, 1991). In particular 
for U.S. data, there is widespread evidence for an aggregate matching function 
where the Cobb-Douglas form has been found to be a convincing specification (see 
Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001, for a survey).
But how strong is the evidence for the existence of an aggregate Cobb-Douglas 
matching function? And how informative are the matching elasticities with respect 
to unemployment and vacancies? We reconsider these issues from two perspectives. 
First, we estimate an aggregate matching function based on administrative labor 
market data for Germany (compare, e.g., Schmieder et al., 2012; Dustmann et 
al., 2009), which enable us to overcome various shortcomings other databases 
suffer from. In particular, German administrative data provide actual labor market 
transitions, a consistent vacancy measure and several control variables for the 
composition of the unemployment pool.1 Our results lend renewed support for 
1 It is well-known that there is duration dependence of individual job finding rates. Recent research by Hornstein 
(2012) and Barnichon and Figura (2011) suggests that this may be due to composition effects of the unemployment 
pool.
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the existence of a Cobb Douglas matching function, where constant returns to 
scale cannot be rejected. Relying on restricted matching elasticities, we further 
demonstrate that it is relevant to account for heterogeneity in the aggregate job 
finding rate.
Second, we set up a simple labor selection model to approach a frictional labor 
market from a theoretical perspective. In this model, each job seeker has a fixed 
contact probability with a firm. The individual job finding probability is driven by 
an idiosyncratic draw from a training cost distribution (see, e.g., Brown et al., 2009; 
Lechthaler et al., 2010, for richer selection models). Thereby, firms post vacancies to 
attract workers, but they do not generate additional jobs in the aggregate, i.e. the 
selection model does not contain a traditional matching function. Nevertheless, 
when we parameterize and simulate our model for Germany, we can investigate 
whether it is consistent with the aggregate matching function that we find in 
the data.2 Our matching function estimations from the simulated data indeed 
replicate the empirical evidence. Thus, our exercise sounds a cautionary note on 
interpreting reduced-form estimations.
Moreover, our exercise has two virtues. On the one hand, it allows testing for 
the validity of the labor selection model. On the other hand, it enables us to gain 
insights into the underlying mechanisms that lead to the empirical observation of 
an aggregate matching function. The latter seems to be desirable as the aggregate 
matching function may shift due to policy changes (see, e.g., Lagos, 2000).
For the theoretical exercise, we use a labor selection model as in Brown et 
al. (2009) and Lechthaler et al. (2010) and simplify it to its core mechanism, i.e. 
a partial equilibrium with exogenous separations.3 We assume that there is an 
exogenous contact rate.4 Upon contact, an idiosyncratic training cost realization 
is decisive for whether a searching worker gets a job or not. Firms have to pay for 
vacancy posting to be recognized by workers. However, labor market dynamics are 
exclusively driven by the cutoff point of idiosyncratic training costs. Thus, although 
there is vacancy posting in this labor market, the role of vacancies is very different 
than in a standard search and matching model. If one more firm enters the market, 
it obtains a certain fraction of all workers who make a contact with firms. This 
additional vacancy does not generate any new jobs because this certain fraction 
of searching workers would have made a contact in any case and the training cost 
realization is unaffected by the number of vacancies.
2 Note that this is a natural benchmark for simulated versions of any labor market model.
3 Brown et al. (2009) and Lechthaler et al. (2009) apply a labor selection model to investigate whether it can generate 
strong labor market reactions to aggregate shocks.
4 We do not claim that this assumption is necessarily very realistic. However, we want to analyze how close such an 
economy can bring us to the conventional matching function relationship.
87Chapter 4
Estimations from Empirical Data
What is the underlying intuition for a fictional matching function in the selection 
model? Job findings are procyclical because a positive aggregate productivity shock 
provides an incentive to firms to hire workers with a larger idiosyncratic training 
cost realization.5 This leads to a countercyclical unemployment rate. Vacancies are 
procyclical because when productivity rises, this raises aggregate profits and more 
firms enter the market to get a share of the increased surpluses. When we test 
whether this cyclical pattern of the variables can generate a matching function, we 
obtain three results. First, we reveal strong evidence for a matching function of the 
prominent Cobb-Douglas form. Second, the coefficients of the matching function 
can be reconciled with constant returns to scale. Third, the matching elasticity 
with respect to unemployment depends on the exogenous contact rate. With a low 
contact rate, we observe a matching function close to the empirical estimations. 
Interestingly, these results are robust with respect to many model modifications. In 
a simplified version of the selection model, we show analytically that the driving 
force behind the estimated elasticity is the first derivative of the expected training 
costs at the cutoff point.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 outlines the German 
administrative database and examines the empirical evidence on the aggregate 
matching function. Section 4.3 derives the simple labor selection model. 
Section  4.4 describes our model parametrization and provides the estimation 
results based on simulated data. Section 4.5 strips down the selection model 
to a version that allows us to illustrate the underlying mechanisms analytically. 
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Estimations from Empirical Data
We use German administrative data for our matching function estimations 
because it offers a coherent definition of matches, unemployment and vacancies. 
The administrative database is provided by the Federal Employment Agency, 
which is responsible for the unemployment insurance system and active labor 
market policies in Germany. Although the administrative information is not fully 
comparable to U.S. data, it offers several advantages. First, we have real vacancies 
instead of a job advertising index for longer time series. Second, it provides actual 
labor market transitions, i.e. we do not have to construct labor market flows from 
unemployment, employment and duration data (see, e.g., Shimer, 2005; 2012). Third, 
the information is not survey-based and we do not have to deal with measurement 
5 Merkl and van Rens (2012) show that the job finding rate and its dynamics are isomorphic in a model with 
idiosyncratic training costs (under a Pareto distribution) and in the search and matching model. However, their 
model does not contain any vacancies and is thus silent on the shape of the matching function.
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errors due to sample rotation or sample attrition. Fourth, we can observe several 
control variables that are likely to influence the search and matching process.
Similar to the evidence for the U.S., there are a number of matching function 
estimations for Germany. Therefore, the next subsection gives a short overview of 
related studies for Germany and points out to what extent our model specification 
differs from the existing literature. Then, we describe our data and estimation 
strategy. Afterwards, we present the estimation results.
4.2.1 Literature Review
The estimation of a matching function may be motivated by various objectives. 
Early studies focus on the matching function itself and investigate its functional 
form, whereas more recent studies tend to deal with specific data issues, such as 
the definition of the matching function variables. Appendix 4.A summarizes several 
papers that estimate a matching function for Germany (see Table 4.A.1).
Burda and Wyplosz (1994) provide an exemplary study for early approaches. 
The authors accept the Cobb-Douglas form against a more general specification 
and cannot reject the hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRS). The weights 
on unemployment and vacancies display a 2 : 1 split, which is supported by 
most of subsequent studies. In contrast, Sunde (2007) relies on segmented labor 
markets and discusses different definitions of matches. The matching elasticities 
of unemployment and vacancies turn out much closer and do hardly sum up to 
unity. Fahr and Sunde (2009) and Klinger and Rothe (2012) estimate an aggregate 
matching function to assess the macroeconomic performance of the Hartz reforms. 
For this purpose, the authors consider “treatment” dummies that indicate whether 
a particular reform was in place or not. The inclusion of the reform dummies, 
however, does not seem to affect the matching elasticities.
Moreover, it can be seen that previous studies mainly rely on official data, 
though the availability of consistent data for longer time periods is limited. However, 
the Federal Employment Agency also provides information on the individual level, 
which comprise labor market biographies over a long time period. Some of the 
existing studies use the micro data to obtain time series on matches, but they do 
not measure unemployment from the same data source. This may lead to a potential 
bias as the micro data is based on notifications on unemployment benefit receipt, 
whereas the official unemployment series accounts for more specific criteria, such 
as search effort. 
We overcome this shortcoming and measure both matches and unemployment 
from the same micro data set. This procedure enables us to obtain long and coherent 
time series. In addition, the micro data include a number of control variables and 
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are available on a daily basis, which allows for a precise and flexible handling of 
the time structure.
4.2.2 Data Description
We use monthly data for reunified Germany from 1993 to 2007. The restriction on 
this time period results from the Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies 
(SIAB) where we extract our time series for matches and unemployment from.
The SIAB presents a 2% random sample of all German residents who are 
registered by the Federal Employment Agency because of paying social security 
contributions or receiving unemployment benefits (see Dorner et al., 2010). The 
data set includes information on the individuals’ labor market status, their wage 
and unemployment income as well as several socio-demographic characteristics. 
This has the advantage of controlling for the composition of the unemployment 
pool and for different search intensities that might emerge from unemployment 
benefit receipt.6
Matches are defined as transitions from unemployment to employment subject 
to social security. Even though marginal employment has become subject to social 
security since 1999, we do not consider this kind of employment because it is 
often regarded as a stepping stone into regular jobs. The transitions are calculated 
continuously, i.e. we take into account every daily transition. Hence, we do not 
neglect any job findings that are reversed within a month.
Unemployment is obtained by an adjusted measure of unemployment benefit 
receipt. As the benefit system has been reformed in course of the Hartz reforms, 
the unemployment benefit measure faces a level shift in 2005. This holds for the 
adjustment procedure according to Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010), which corrects 
for unemployment periods without benefit receipt.7
Vacancies are taken from the official statistics and cover open positions that 
are reported to the Federal Employment Agency.8 According to the IAB Job Vacancy 
Survey, the reported vacancies account for about 30–40% of overall vacancies in 
Germany. As this survey is available at least on a yearly basis, it enables us to adjust 
the vacancy series in some way. However, it remains unclear to what extent the 
reporting rate is representative for socially secured jobs. Consequently, we leave 
the adjustment of vacancies to the robustness analysis.9
6 See, e.g., Katz and Meyer (1990), who find evidence for an influence of unemployment benefit receipt on the 
workers’ job acceptance behavior.
7 For a comprehensive description of the unemployment definition see Nordmeier (2012).
8 In line with our measurement of matches, we exclude vacancies for marginal employment as job opportunity. 
9 Appendix 4.B illustrates the reporting rate of vacancies.
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Figure 4.1 shows the time series of matches, unemployment and vacancies. One 
striking feature of matches is their high volatility. While the matches amount 
to around 220,000 per month, monthly unemployment changes are much 
lower implying that there is a high labor turnover. Along with the redefinition 
of unemployment and the larger pool of captured job seekers, matches display a 
level shift in 2005 and average around 260,000 job findings per month afterwards. 
Note that the upward shift in the number of unemployed is also driven by the 
adjustment of unemployment periods before and after benefit receipt. The 
adjustment procedure accounts for about 10% of the unemployment pool before 
2005 and goes up to nearly 20% after the Hartz reforms have been implemented. 
Nevertheless, unemployment decreases remarkably in subsequent years, which is 
ascribed to both the labor market reforms and the upswing in those years. The 
reported vacancies move from nearly 300,000 to around 600,000 positions over 
the sample period, where the development after the Hartz IV reform is considerable 
as well. Moreover, the adjustment of registered vacancies with the reporting rate 
causes primarily a level shift and does not appear to affect the fluctuations of 
vacancies.
4.2.3 Estimation Strategy
We rely on the following estimation procedure. First, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas 
function with unrestricted matching elasticities 
 (4.1)
where M are matches, U is unemployment, V are vacancies, trend is a linear time 
trend, d2005 is a shift dummy that takes the value of one from 2005 onwards and  
is the error term. Unemployment and vacancies are measured at the end of month 
t – 1 and thus display the beginning-of-month-t stocks. Accordingly, our measures 
of unemployment and vacancies are not depleted by the endogenous variable.
Equation 4.1 allows us to test the hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
(β1 + β2 = 1). Once we cannot reject the constant returns to scale assumption, 
we proceed by estimating a Cobb-Douglas function with restricted matching 
elasticities. Then, our second specification equals 
 (4.2)
where f = M/U is the job finding rate and θ = V/U denotes the labor market tightness.
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Figure 4.1: Matches, unemployment and vacancies
Notes :  (a) Matches per month, (b) Unemployment, (c) Reported vacancies (solid line) and adjusted vacancies 
(dashed line). Sample measures are projected by multiplication with 50.
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To account for the effects of a changing unemployment pool on the aggregate job 
finding rate, we finally extend Equation 4.2 by observable control variables 
 (4.3)
where controls capture both individual characteristics and factors that are assumed 
to influence the individuals’ search effort.10 This specification implies different 
matching efficiencies for heterogeneous workers and thus different job finding 
rates within the unemployment pool.11
4.2.4 Results
Table 4.1 presents the results from matching function estimations with 
unrestricted parameters. The first regression displays a standard ordinary least 
squares (OLS) estimation. Because the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic indicates 
positive autocorrelation in the residuals, the second regression explicitly allows for 
a first-order autocorrelated error term. The third estimation shows an instrumented 
variable (IV) regression using lagged unemployment and vacancies in order to 
address a potential bias in case of endogeneity.12
Table 4.1: Unrestricted matching function estimations
(i) (ii) (iii) 
constant -4.8237* -5.4194* -5.4180** 
log U–1 0.8860*** 0.9166*** 0.9246*** 
log V–1 0.2827*** 0.2930*** 0.2831*** 
trend -0.0004** -0.0004* -0.0004 
d2005 -0.1131*** -0.1159** -0.1218** 
adjusted R 2 0.4495 0.4983 0.4448 
DW statistic 1.3619 2.0757 –
CRS t-statistic 1.0074 0.9533 1.1184 
Notes:  (i) OLS estimation, (ii) OLS estimation with AR(1) disturbance term, (iii) IV estimation with Newey-West 
standard errors. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
10 See Appendix 4.D for a detailed description of generated control variables.
11 Obviously, a further extension could be a decomposition of the matching elasticity, but our methodological exercise 
solely asks for aggregate parameters.
12 Even though our matching function specification does not face a simultaneity problem due to a precise timing of 
stocks and flows, we are precautionary with respect to an omitted variable bias.
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The results are similar across the different estimation approaches and show a 
fairly good fit in terms of the adjusted R 2. The coefficients of unemployment and 
vacancies are significant at the 1% level and seem to be robust. The matching 
elasticity with respect to unemployment is about 0.9, while the matching elasticity 
with respect to vacancies is nearly 0.3. Although the matching elasticities sum 
up to above unity, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot be rejected 
in any case. Appendix 4.C demonstrates that this holds for several robustness 
checks. In particular, the adjustment of vacancies with the reporting rate and the 
consideration of labor market rates do hardly alter our benchmark results. The sum 
of the matching elasticities from quarterly data points closer to unity, whereas the 
coefficients from the subsample before the Hartz IV reform and from detrended 
data deviate somewhat more. From a statistical point of view, however, the results 
cannot be discriminated from constant returns to scale. Therefore, we rely on the 
homogeneity of the matching function and proceed by imposing the constant 
returns to scale assumption on the matching elasticities.
Table 4.2 shows the results from estimating the matching function with 
restricted coefficients. Thereby, the coefficient of the labor market tightness   
represents the matching elasticity with respect to vacancies. Compared to the 
unrestricted estimations, the weight on vacancies decreases slightly to 0.25. The 
Durbin-Watson statistic again indicates a positively autocorrelated error term, 
but the stepwise inclusion of control variables eliminates the serial correlation. 
Accordingly, it seems that we achieve efficient estimates by solely accounting for 
heterogeneity on the workers’ side. Nevertheless, it is worth stressing that we are 
able to overcome the serial correlation definitely when we consider benefit-related 
control variables in addition to sociodemographic characteristics. This might 
indicate that the unemployment insurance system indeed influences the search 
and matching process.13 Moreover, controlling for observable heterogeneity in the 
unemployment pool strengthens the role of vacancies as the matching elasticity of 
vacancies in relation to unemployment increases to 0.35.
To sum up, our data estimations provide renewed evidence in favor of a Cobb-
Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale. Hence, from an empirical 
point of view the formulation of the search and matching process via a matching 
function seems to be a reliable concept. However, in the next sections we will 
question the standard interpretation of the matching function by confronting the 
empirical evidence with a labor selection model that does not contain a matching 
function.
13 Note that aggregate studies often have failed to find an influence of the unemployment insurance system, which 
may result from the difficulty of measuring institutional aspects in a time series (see Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001).
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Table 4.2: Restricted matching function estimations
(iv) (v) (vi) (vii) 
constant -2.3498*** -7.3804*** -4.3403** -4.8473** 
log θ
 –1 0.2458*** 0.3116*** 0.3463*** 0.3507*** 
trend -0.0003** -0.0043* -0.0054** -0.0038 
d2005 -0.0798*** -0.0472 -0.0766 -0.1290** 
young yes yes yes 
old yes yes yes 
low-skilled yes yes yes 
high-skilled yes yes yes 
foreign yes yes yes 
female yes yes yes 
married yes yes yes 
child yes yes yes 
long-term yes yes yes 
UB I receipt yes yes 
x replacement ratio yes 
x rest entitlement yes 
adjusted R 2 0.5134 0.5805 0.6162 0.6284 
DW statistic 1.3664 1.6935 1.8407 1.8477 
Notes:  OLS estimations. Control variables denote shares of the unemployment pool. In specification (vii), the 
share of unemployment benefit (UB) I recipients is interacted with the replacement ratio and rest 
entitlement, respectively. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
4.3 A Simple Selection Model
4.3.1 Model Environment
Our economy is populated with a continuum of workers who can either be employed 
or unemployed. Employed workers are separated with an exogenous probability   . 14 
Unemployed workers look for a job. It is standard practice in the search and matching 
literature to assume that workers’ contact probability is endogenous and driven by 
a matching function, while the selection probability (i.e. the probability of being 
selected after an interview) is usually assumed to be exogenous/degenerate. In our 
baseline specification, we assume the opposite case, namely an exogenous contact 
probability, c  ≤1. Thus, the dynamics of the job finding rate is completely driven by 
the selection rate. When workers obtain an interview, they draw an idiosyncratic 
training cost realization εit . Firms will only hire workers with training costs  , 
14 In Appendix 4.E we report numerical results for a version of the model with endogenous separations. As our core 
results are unaffected by this modification, we restrict our attention to the simpler case of exogenous separations.
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where  is the cutoff point that makes a firm indifferent between hiring and not 
hiring. The sequence in our selection model and in standard search and matching 
models is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
We assume that firms have to post vacancies to obtain a share of the economy wide 
applicants (namely, the firm’s vacancy divided by the overall number of vacancies, 
which is determined by a free-entry condition). Since the contact probability is 
exogenous in our baseline specification, more vacancies do not create more jobs, 
but just lead to a different allocation of workers.
4.3.2 The Selection Decision
Once worker-firm pairs have been formed, firms decide whether to hire a particular 
worker or not. There is a random worker-firm pair specific idiosyncratic training 
cost shock, εit, which is iid across workers and time
15, with density function f  (εt ) 
and the cumulative distribution F (εt ). εt is observed by the worker and the firm. 
Thus, the expected discounted profit, , of hiring an unemployed worker is 
equal to the current productivity minus the current wage (which may be dependent 
on ε), wt (εt ), minus the idiosyncratic random training cost shock, εt , and a fixed 
training cost component, h, plus the expected discounted future profits: 
 (4.4)
with 
  (4.5)
15 Due to the iid assumption, we abstract from the worker-firm pair specific index i from here onwards.
Figure 4.2: Contact and selection
Our model Degenerate
Idiosyncratic  
training costs
Usual model Matching  
function
Degenerate
Searching  
workers
Contact Selection JobInterview
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δ is the discount factor. Incumbent worker-firm pairs are not subject to further 
training costs.16 Thus, an incumbent workers’ wage does not depend on εt.
The firm hires an unemployed worker whenever there is an expected positive 
surplus. Thus, the selection rate is given by: 
 (4.6)
4.3.3 Firms’ Free-Entry Decision
We assume that each vacancy corresponds to one firm. Entrepreneurs who want to 
enter the market have to pay a fixed vacancy posting cost . They know that the 
vacancy will be filled with a certain probability, namely the number of searching 
workers at the beginning of the period, st , multiplied with the contact and selection 
rates divided by the number of aggregate vacancies. Thus, entrepreneurs will enter 
the market up to the point where the expected costs of finding a worker equals the 
expected return of finding a worker.
Thus, new firms will post vacancies as long as 
 (4.7)
where the left-hand side is the average cost of posting a vacancy (vacancy 
posting cost divided by the probability of finding a worker). The right-hand side 
is the expected return from hiring a worker, namely the expected return in the 
contemporaneous period (since vacancies are posted before the interview, the 
expected training cost realization conditional on being hired is taken into account) 
and the expected return in future periods. Thus, in equilibrium 
 . (4.8)
Importantly, in our baseline specification more vacancies do not lead to more 
jobs in the aggregate since we have fixed the contact probability exogenously. 
However, it is perfectly rational for individual firms to enter the market. Under 
a positive aggregate productivity shock, the expected returns of hiring a worker 
increase. Thus, more firms will enter the market to compete for these profits until 
the free-entry condition holds again. This will make vacancies procyclical, although 
they do not have any effects on the number of newly created jobs in our baseline 
specification.
16 We relax this assumption in Appendix 4.E.
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4.3.4 Wages
As in standard search and matching models, worker-firm pairs are associated with 
rents. Workers are worse off quitting the job because this would require searching 
for a new job and drawing a new training cost realization (with a probability smaller 
than 1 to find a job). If a firm loses the worker, it will have to post a new vacancy 
and try to find a new worker. Thus, once workers and firms are matched, there is 
a bilateral monopoly. We assume that rents will be shared by Nash bargaining 
between each worker-firm pair.
The flow value of a job for a newly employed worker is 
  (4.9)
and the flow value of a job for an incumbent worker is 
  (4.10)
The fallback option for all workers is the value of unemployment: 
  (4.11)
where b denotes unemployment compensation.
The firm’s value of a newly filled vacancy and the value of a continuing match 
are given by Equations 4.4 and 4.5, respectively. We assume that the fixed training 
cost component is sunk (i.e. has to be payed before bargaining).17
Under disagreement, the firm’s fallback position is equal to 0, i.e. the firm can 
break the interview at zero cost and can post a new vacancy, which has a zero value 
in equilibrium.
The wages are thus determined by the following maximization problem: 
 (4.12)
and 
  (4.13)
17 This assumption is without loss of generality for our matching function estimations in the theoretical model. It 
prevents that some of the entrants’ wages are negative. The latter would prevent calculating a meaningful mean-
min ratio and thus limit the possibilities for comparisons to the data.
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The solution to this problem is: 
 (4.14)
and 
 (4.15)
Note that our bargaining corresponds to the standard bargaining under search and 
matching. Wages look somewhat more cumbersome because entrants are assumed 
to be subject to training costs, while incumbent workers are not.
4.3.5 Employment
We assume an economy with a fixed labor force L, which is normalized to 1. Thus, 
the employment stock is equal to the employment rate, n. The unemployment rate is 
denoted with u. Thus, the employment dynamics in this economy is determined by 
.  (4.16)
The number of searching workers, st , is thus equal to the number of unemployed 
workers at the end of period t – 1.
4.3.6 Labor Market Equilibrium
The labor market equilibrium consists of Equations 4.5, 4.8, 4.14, 4.15, 4.6 and 4.16. 
In the dynamic version of the model, we will assume that aggregate productivity is 
governed by a first-order autocorrelation process.
4.4 Estimations from Simulated Data
4.4.1 Parametrization of Model
We parameterize the model on a quarterly basis.18 In line with our data, we set the 
separation rate to 0.03 and the target of the steady state job finding rate to 0.15. 
18 Calibrating the model on a monthly basis does not change our results. However, due to the small German labor 
market flows, a monthly calibration may generate numerical problems. Since we simulate the model as a system of 
log-linearized first-order difference equations, the smaller the labor market flows are, the larger is the likelihood of 
obtaining a job finding rate below zero due to a larger negative shock. A simulation in the full nonlinear setting of 
equations would prevent this problem.
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The discount factor is 0.99, the bargaining power of workers is 0.5 and vacancy 
posting costs are set to 0.1.
The steady state productivity is normalized to 1. We simulate the model with 
productivity shocks that have an autocorrelation of 0.95 and a standard deviation 
of 1%. Unemployment compensation is 0.8.
We vary the contact rate from 0.2 to 1. In order to close our model, we adjust 
the mean of our training costs to get the desired steady state selection rate. 
Depending on our specification, the mean training cost varies between 40% and 
90% of quarterly productivity. The distribution of training costs is assumed to be 
Gaussian. To our knowledge, there is no empirical evidence for the distribution 
of training costs in Germany. Therefore, we vary the standard deviation of the 
training cost shock, σ, between 0.25 and 1. In light of evidence on U.S. training 
costs (see, e.g., Barron et al., 1989; Dolfin, 2006) these appear to be plausible 
parameters. However, as we show, our core results are unaffected by variations in 
this parameter.
4.4.2 Simulation
We simulate the model 1,000 times. Each time we use 60 periods corresponding to 
the 60 quarters in our data to estimate the matching function from above:19 
  (4.17)
We approach the simulated data as an applied econometrician who is unaware of 
the true data generating process in the economy and conjectures that there is a 
Cobb-Douglas matching function.
Table 4.3 shows the estimation results for different contact rates. Several 
observations are worthwhile pointing out. First, the estimations indeed suggest 
the existence of a Cobb-Douglas matching function. The coefficients are highly 
significant in any of the 1,000 simulations.20 This is astonishing as our theoretical 
model does not originally contain the matching function that we estimated. Not 
only do we find evidence in favor of a Cobb-Douglas matching function, the 
sum of coefficients is also remarkably close to unity. The acceptance rate of 
19 We omit the linear time trend conventionally used in empirical estimations as we only consider mean-reverting 
shocks.
20 We do not report test-statistics as means over simulations would not have a meaningful interpretation in 
this context. Instead, we have checked in every single estimation if the coefficients are significant at the 5% 
level, if constant returns are rejected or if the coefficients lie within the confidence interval of the empirical 
counterpart.
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constant returns is always above 60%21 in any of the combinations of c and σ. 
In most cases, acceptance rates are between 70 and 80%. We therefore do not 
report results for the reduced form specification, as the coefficients are hardly 
changed.
Second, the estimated coefficients on unemployment and vacancies are hardly 
changed by variations in the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic training cost 
shock. We are therefore confident that our results are not driven by arbitrary 
assumptions about the distribution of the training costs.
Table 4.3: Matching functions for different contact rates
c = 1 c = 0.75 c = 0.5 c = 0.25 c = 0.2 
σ = 0.25
constant -0.05 -0.17 -0.38 -0.96 -1.28 
log U–1 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.41 0.51 
log V–1 0.80 0.77 0.72 0.56 0.44 
CRS rate 70% 71% 68% 66% 63% 
σ = 0.5
constant -0.60 -0.69 -0.87 -1.31 -1.53 
log U–1 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.42 0.53 
log V–1 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.57 0.45 
CRS rate 75% 75% 72% 70% 72% 
σ = 1
constant -1.14 -1.23 -1.36 -1.68 -1.82 
log U–1 0.20 0.22 0.26 0.42 0.53 
log V–1 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.57 0.46 
CRS rate 78% 76% 78% 76% 77% 
Notes:  Coefficients are means over 1,000 simulations. CRS rate reports in how many percent the constant returns 
to scale assumption could not be rejected. 
Finally, the weight on unemployment increases with a lower exogenous contact 
rate. The estimation results for an economy with low exogenous contact rates 
(e.g., 0.2 or 0.25) resemble very much the estimation results for the German 
economy in Section 4.2.4. In regression (vii), the confidence interval for the 
coefficient on market tightness (vacancies) ranges from 0.20 to 0.50. The 
coefficient on vacancies for the lowest contact rate clearly lies within these 
bands. Indeed, the confidence intervals from our simulation exercise and the 
empirical confidence interval always overlap for a contact rate of 0.2. Extending 
21 60% in this context means that in 60 out of 100 simulations constant returns could not be rejected.
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the model to include endogenous separations does not alter our results as can 
be seen in Appendix 4.E.
Thus, our exercise implies that our simple selection model can generate an 
aggregate matching function of the form that is usually found in the data.
4.4.3 Further Statistics
Table 4.4 reports some further interesting features of the selection model. The 
model consistently generates a negative correlation between unemployment and 
vacancies, although somewhat smaller than in the real data. In addition, although 
the relative volatility of unemployment with respect to productivity shocks is low 
compared to the data, the model’s performance in this respect is much better 
than a comparably simplistic search and matching model as in Shimer (2005). 
Amplification is especially high for a relatively tight distribution of training costs 
and high contact rates. Note that these results hinge neither on wage stickiness 
as in Hall (2005) nor on a small surplus calibration as in Hagedorn and Manovskii 
(2008). Furthermore, for low contact rates and a wider distribution of training 
costs, the model generates a substantial wage dispersion, as measured by the 
mean-min ratio. Thus, our model faces a similar tradeoff between amplification 
and wage dispersion as other search models (see Hornstein et al., 2011).
Table 4.4: Further statistics from simulated model
c = 1 c = 0.75 c = 0.5 c = 0.25 c = 0.2 data
σ = 0.25
corr (U, V ) -0.27 -0.28 -0.32 -0.43 -0.50 0.04 (-0.83)
SD(u)/SD(a) 3.82 3.79 3.68 3.24 2.76 12.92
wage ratio 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.08 1.11 1.78
σ = 0.5
corr (U, V ) -0.26 -0.27 -0.32 -0.43 -0.50 0.04 (-0.83)
SD(u)/SD(a) 3.22 3.18 3.05 2.53 2.01 12.92
wage ratio 1.07 1.08 1.09 1.17 1.23 1.78
σ = 1
corr (U, V) -0.26 -0.29 -0.31 -0.41 -0.49 0.04 (-0.83)
SD(u)/SD(a) 2.46 2.42 2.29 1.72 1.27 12.92
wage ratio 1.11 1.13 1.17 1.34 1.53 1.78 
Notes:  The reported figures are means over 1,000 simulations. U and V are beginning-of-period stocks. Standard 
deviations (SD) have been calculated from HP filtered series with smoothing parameter λ = 105. The wage 
ratio corresponds to the mean-min ratio, defined as the 50 to 10 percentiles ratio of the wage distribution. 
The empirical data refer to the time period 1993–2007 (1993–2004). 
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4.5 Fictional Matching Function Analytics
4.5.1 Static Toy Model Mechanics
In the previous numerical section, we have simulated the full dynamic model and 
estimated whether we find evidence for an aggregate matching function. We have 
indeed found numerical evidence for a Cobb-Douglas constant returns to scale 
specification. This section simplifies the underlying model to a static version in 
order to make analytical statements.
We assume that all workers are exogenously separated after having produced for 
one period, i.e. all workers are unemployed/searching at the beginning of the period. 
Thus, the employment level after matching corresponds to the job finding rate which 
is the product of the exogenous contact rate and the endogenous selection rate 
n = cη.  (4.18)
A firm hires all workers that generate a profit, i.e. 
ε < a – w(ε).  (4.19)
Let us assume for simplicity that the wage is a constant share of aggregate 
productivity and the idiosyncratic training cost realization22 
w = α (a – ε).  (4.20)
Thus, workers are hired up to the point 
 = a.  (4.21)
The selection rate in the economy is 
  (4.22)
Although more vacancies do not lead to more jobs in the aggregate, firms 
compete for the applicants and post vacancies until the expected return is equal 
to the expected cost. Since vacancies are posted before contacts take place, the 
free-entry condition is based on ex-ante expected profits, i.e. 
22 We can show that our results hold for more general wage settings.
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. 
 
(4.23)
What would an empirical researcher do who looks for a matching function? 
In the standard constant returns specification he or she would estimate 
. In the static version of the model, the beginning of the 
period unemployment stock was assumed to be 1. Thus, the empirical researcher 
would implicitly estimate . In a simple OLS estimation, he or she 
would estimate how strongly the job finding rate and vacancies co-move in 
percentage terms.
We can calculate this connection analytically, namely , by deriving the 
elasticity of the job finding rate with respect to productivity and by deriving the 
elasticity of vacancies with respect to productivity: 
  (4.24)
  (4.25)
Thus, the empirical “matching function” correlation is: 
 .  (4.26)
Interestingly, this expression corresponds exactly to the first derivative of the 
expected training costs conditional on being selected. Proof: 
 . (4.27)
Important: In the dynamic simulations, we obtain the same result. The estimated 
elasticity of the matching function with respect to vacancies is driven by the first 
derivative of the expected idiosyncratic training cost realization conditional on 
being selected.
4.5.2 Intuition
In our framework, the estimated matching function relationship is a “fictional 
relationship”, i.e. more vacancies do not lead to more jobs, but there is a positive 
correlation between the job finding rate and market tightness. What is the 
underlying economic mechanism?
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When productivity rises, firms have an incentive to hire workers with larger 
idiosyncratic training costs. Thus, hiring/selection is clearly procyclical. When 
productivity rises, this also increases the returns from posting a vacancy. Thus, 
firms compete for the larger pie of profits and more of them enter the market. 
These two mechanisms combined lead to a positive comovement between the job 
finding rate and vacancies.
What is the intuitive reason that vacancies rise less than proportionally 
compared to the job finding rate (or put differently: why is there a concave 
relationship with respect to vacancies in the fictional matching function)? With 
larger productivity, the increase of the job finding rate is driven by the density at a 
given point in a distribution. Assume for illustration purposes that the underlying 
distribution is uniform. Then a one percent rise in productivity would lead to the 
same absolute deviation of the job finding rate independently of the point of the 
distribution, i.e. the level of the job finding rate.
The dynamics of the job finding rate is driven by the ex-post realization of 
training costs. By contrast, the dynamics of the vacancy posting process is driven by 
the ex-ante expectations of profits. Entrepreneurs anticipate that larger aggregate 
productivity means that they will hire more workers with larger idiosyncratic 
training costs. Thus, the realization of the conditional distribution of training costs 
becomes relevant. To be more precise: the first derivative tells us how fast the 
average training costs of hired workers rise if more workers are selected. Due to 
this countervailing effect, vacancies rise less than proportionally compared to the 
job finding rate.
Why does a smaller exogenous contact rate lead to a smaller elasticity of the 
job finding rate with respect to vacancies? Technically speaking, in a calibration 
that targets the steady state job finding rate, an exogenous reduction of the 
contact probability automatically raises the selection rate. For a given absolute 
deviation, this leads to a smaller log deviation (see denominator of Equation 4.24). 
In addition, the numerator of Equation 4.24 may change (sign unclear). For an 
underlying normal distribution and large selection rates (> 0.5), smaller contact/
larger selection rates lead to an unambiguous reduction of the log deviation.
By contrast, the log deviation of vacancies increases with smaller exogenous 
contact rates. Why? For a given job finding rate, a smaller contact rate leads 
to a larger selection rate. This increases the conditional expectations term in 
Equation  4.25 (i.e. the denominator falls) and the log deviation increases.
Combining these two effects, a smaller contact rate and a larger selection rate 
lead to a smaller log deviation of the job finding rate and a larger log deviation 
of vacancies with respect to productivity. Thus, as shown in Equation 4.26, with a 
smaller contact rate, an empirical researcher would estimate a smaller elasticity 
105Chapter 4
Fictional Matching Function Analytics
of the job finding rate with respect to vacancies, i.e. the coefficient on vacancies 
in the matching function would fall. This is exactly what we find in our numerical 
estimations.
4.5.3 Connection to Simulation
In our numerical section, there was a clear trade-off in the calibration. A smaller 
contact rate leads to a larger steady state selection rate. Assuming a normal 
distribution for the idiosyncratic training costs, a larger selection rate moves the 
steady state cutoff point to the right (i.e. to a point in the distribution where the 
first derivative of the conditional expectation of the idiosyncratic training costs 
with respect to productivity is smaller).
Figure 4.3 illustrates this connection. The first panel shows the conditional 
expectation of idiosyncratic training costs, namely . The second 
panel shows the first derivative of this expression, corresponding to Equation 4.26. 
In our estimations, the estimated elasticity of matches with respect to vacancies 
corresponds almost exactly to the first derivative of the expected training cost at 
the cutoff point, just as our analytical exercise above would predict.
Thus, our calibrated model can only match the coefficients of the empirical 
matching function when we assume a relatively small exogenous contact rate and 
a relatively larger selection rate (moving the steady state cutoff point to the right). 
Very small contact rates may seem unrealistic from the perspective of an Anglo-
Saxon labor market. Three comments are in order. First, German labor market flows 
are a lot smaller than, for example, American labor market flows. Second, this fact 
is even reinforced by the administrative data we use because it provides a fairly 
broad definition of unemployment (leading to a data consistent unemployment 
rate of more than 10%). Third, we have some preliminary evidence from a survey 
data set that the contact rate in Germany is indeed very small. The labor market 
survey PASS shows that only around 30% of all searching workers get an interview 
in a given month (see Appendix 4.F for details).
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4.6 Conclusion
This paper has reconsidered the matching function, which has become a popular 
tool to model labor market frictions in a tractable way. Therefore, we have derived 
the conventional Cobb-Douglas specification from two different perspectives.
In a first step, we have estimated an aggregate matching function from German 
administrative data. Despite empirical support by previous studies, the existing 
matching function estimations may suffer from biases due to incoherent measures 
of matches, unemployment and vacancies. We have used detailed information on 
individual labor market biographies to overcome this shortcoming. Our empirical 
results provide renewed evidence in favor of a constant returns Cobb-Douglas 
matching function. Relying on restricted matching elasticities, we further show that 
it is important to control for the composition of the unemployment pool as well as 
for different search incentives resulting from the unemployment insurance system.
Figure 4.3: Conditional expectation for normal distribution (σ = 1)
(a) Conditional expectation of idiosyncratic training costs
(b) First derivative of conditional expectation
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In a second step, we have set up a simple model of labor selection. In this model, 
more vacancies do not lead to more matches in the aggregate but appear as a worker 
attraction device. Upon an exogenous contact rate, the individual job finding rate 
solely depends on an idiosyncratic draw from a training cost distribution. Even 
though the selection model does not contain a matching function, we have been 
able to estimate one by simulating the model with an aggregate productivity 
shock. Interestingly, our simulation results provide evidence in favor of a standard 
Cobb-Douglas matching function. Moreover, simulations with low contact rates 
are successful in replicating the empirical results.
We have explained the underlying mechanism in an analytically tractable 
version of the selection model, where we show that the matching elasticity with 
respect to vacancies is determined by the first derivative of expected training costs 
at the cutoff point. Thus, our paper suggests that the empirical evidence of the 
matching function may have a completely different interpretation.
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4.A Previous Matching Function Studies
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Table 4.A.1: Aggregate matching function estimations for Germany (continued)
Author(s) Model specification 
Estimation 
approach 
Coef. [ln U] 
(elasticity) 
Coef. [ln V] 
(elasticity) 
CRS 
hypothesis 
(adjusted) 
R 2 
Buttler and 
Cramer (1991) 
Cobb-Douglas – 0.54 0.45 – 0.84 
Burda (1983) Cobb-Douglas pooled 0.62 0.20 rejected 0.79 
fixed 
effects 
0.88 0.11 not 
rejected 
0.93 
pooled 0.99 0.17 not 
rejected 
0.77 
fixed 
effects 
1.75 0.09 rejected 0.83 
Burda and 
Wyplosz (1994) 
Cobb-Douglas 
(accepted 
against CES) 
White’s 
robust 
std. errors 
0.68 0.27 not rejected 0.97 
0.71 0.29 constrained 0.98 
Gross (1997) Cobb-Douglas error
correction 
model 
0.55 1.27 rejected – 
0.89/0.37 0.40/0.19 (not) 
rejected 
– 
Entorf (1998) Cobb-Douglas pooled 0.07 (insign.) 0.32 – 0.74 
0.41 0.59 constrained 0.61 
-0.22 (insign.) 0.08 (insign.) – 0.56 
0.35 0.65 constrained 0.13 
Kosfeld (2006) Cobb-Douglas pooled 0.77 0.13 rejected 0.95 
0.86 0.09 rejected 0.97 
Sunde (2007) Cobb-Douglas – 0.31 0.23 – 0.98 
0.44 0.14 – 0.96 
0.35 0.25 – 0.97 
0.50 0.42 – 0.97 
Fahr and 
Sunde (2009) 
Cobb-Douglas occupation 
and time 
fixed 
effects 
1.01 -0.28  
(insign.) 
– 0.48 
2.27 0.04 – 0.57 
Klinger and 
Rothe (2012) 
Cobb-Douglas two-stage 
least squares 
with regional 
fixed effects 
0.58 
0.56
0.06 
0.08
– 
–
0.98 
0.98
0.57 0.08 – 0.98 
Poeschel 
(2012) 
Cobb-Douglas generalized 
method of 
moments 
(GMM) 
0.77 0.23 constrained 0.89 
Note: CES = constant elasticity of substitution. 
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4.B Reporting Rate of Vacancies
The IAB Job Vacancy Survey (Erhebung des gesamtwirtschaftlichen Stellenangebots, 
EgS) aims to gain information on the structure of open positions in Germany. The 
survey enquires the number of vacancies as well as the related search process 
from a representative sample of firms and administrations, which are randomly 
drawn from the register of the Federal Employment Agency. The questionnaire 
started in 1989 for Western Germany and was extended to Eastern Germany in 
1992. It takes place each fourth quarter a year and has a response rate of about 
20%. See Kettner and Vogeler-Ludwig (2010) for details on the implementation 
of the survey.
The questions include a firm’s number of vacancies and the number of vacancies 
that a firm has reported to an employment agency. The aggregate share of reported 
vacancies is deduced by using an iterative projection method, which accounts 
for different sectors and firm sizes. The dots in Figure 4.B.1 illustrate the official 
reporting rates over our observation period. It can be seen that the reporting rate 
first amounts to 30–40% and then increases to nearly 48%. Interestingly, the 
reporting behavior does not appear to be affected by the business cycle nor the 
emergence of online job markets in the early 2000s. However, the incentive of 
reporting vacancies to an employment agency seems to be influenced by the Hartz 
reforms, which have also induced new forms of subsidized employment.
Figure 4.B.1: Reporting rate
Notes: Interpolated reporting rate of vacancies. Dots show the official values for the fourth quarter each year.
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We interpolate the yearly reporting rates to a monthly time series by applying 
the Catmull-Rom spline. Therefore, we assume that the official reporting rate is 
representative for the middle of each survey period. The Catmull-Rom spline then 
leads to a continuous curve that passes through all given reporting rates (so-called 
control points).
4.C Robustness Checks of the CRS Assumption
Table 4.C.1: Matching function estimations with adjusted vacancies
(i) (ii) (iii) 
constant -5.2998* -6.2945* -6.4749** 
log U–1 0.8644*** 0.9127*** 0.9331*** 
log V–1 0.3199*** 0.3390*** 0.3293*** 
trend -0.0004** -0.0005* -0.0004** 
d2005 -0.0784** -0.0835* -0.0931** 
adjusted R 2 0.4284 0.4897 0.4242 
DW statistic 1.3070 2.0924 –
C RS t-statistic 1.0044 1.0284 1.3611 
Note: Adjustment of vacancies with reporting rate.
Table 4.C.2: Matching function estimations with labor market rates
(i) (ii) (iii) 
constant -1.7464*** -1.6616* -1.6643*** 
log u–1 0.9425*** 0.9662*** 0.9820*** 
log v–1 0.2964*** 0.3045*** 0.2976*** 
trend -0.0005** -0.0006** -0.0005** 
d2005 -0.1200*** -0.1200*** -0.1200*** 
adjusted R 2 0.5305 0.5683 0.5235 
DW statistic 1.3683 2.0734 –
C RS t-statistic 1.5460 1.3071 1.5602 
Note:  Unemployment and vacancies are divided by the corresponding labor force, i.e. the sum of employment 
subject to social security and unemployment. 
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Table 4.C.3: Matching function estimations on quarterly frequency
(i) (ii) (iii) 
constant -2.0567 -1.9551 -3.4188 
log U-1 0.8170*** 0.8169*** 0.9035*** 
log V-1 0.2353*** 0.2281*** 0.2389*** 
trend -0.0012* -0.0004 -0.0013* 
d2005 -0.0813* -0.1159 -0.0983** 
adjusted R 2 0.6139 0.6710 0.5951 
DW statistic 1.0985 2.1052 –
C RS t-statistic 0.2942 0.2168 0.7480 
Note: U and V are end-of-quarter stocks.
Table 4.C.4: Matching function estimations in subsample 1993–2004
(i) (ii) (iii) 
constant -6.1390* -11.7852** -7.6186** 
log U-1 0.9634*** 1.2577*** 1.0477*** 
log V-1 0.2934*** 0.3847*** 0.3086*** 
trend -0.0004** -0.0006* -0.0005** 
adjusted R 2 0.1772 0.3304 0.1680 
DW statistic 1.1189 2.1403 –
C RS t-statistic 1.1431 1.6144 1.5173 
Note: Exclusion of post-reform period
Table 4.C.5: Matching function estimations with detrended variables
(i) (ii) (iii) 
log U-1 0.5785*** 0.6298*** 0.7092*** 
log V-1 0.1316* 0.1456* 0.0911 
d2005 -0.0749*** -0.0581*** -0.0816*** 
adjusted R 2 0.1036 0.1305 0.0980 
DW statistic 1.5950 2.0105 –
C RS t-statistic -1.7329* -1.0891 -1.1127 
Notes:  U and V are detrended by using the HP filter with λ = 14,400. In this case, d2005 denotes an impulse 
dummy in 2005M1.
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4.D Control Variables
Table 4.D.1: Description of control variables
Data Variable Definition 
Age young Share of unemployed with age ≤ 25 years 
old Share of unemployed with age ≥ 55 years 
Education low-skilled Share of unemployed without vocational training  
(see Fitzenberger et al., 2005)
high-skilled Share of unemployed with university degree  
(see Fitzenberger et al., 2005)
Nationality foreign Share of unemployed with immigration background
(see Wichert and Wilke, 2012)
Gender female Share of female unemployed 
Family status married Share of married unemployed 
child Share of unemployed with at least one child 
Unemployment  
duration 
long-term Share of long-term unemployed  
(unemployment duration ≥  1 year) 
Benefit receipt U B I receipt Share of unemployment benefit (UB) I recipients 
Income replacement ratio Median of UB I payments over median of wages 
Rest entitlement rest entitlement Median of UB I rest entitlements in days 
Figure 4.D.1: Control variables (I)
 young  old  low-skilled  high-skilled  foreign
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Figure 4.D.2: Control variables (II)
 female  married  child  long-term (corrected)
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Figure 4.D.3: Control variables (III)
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4.E Endogenous Separations
The “fictional” matching function estimated from the simulated data can also be 
obtained if we relax our assumption of exogenous separations. Table 4.E.1 reports 
the results for a version of the selection model where both entrants and incumbents 
are subject to the idiosyncratic shock and where firing is endogenous.23 Compared 
to the model with exogenous separations, the results are hardly changed.
Table 4.E.1: Matching functions for model with endogenous separations
c = 1 c = 0.75 c = 0.5 c = 0.25 c = 0.2 
σ = 0.25
constant -0.59 -0.69 -0.86 -1.29 -1.51 
log U-1 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.41 0.52 
log V
-1 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.58 0.47 
CRS rate 69% 69% 68% 67% 63% 
σ = 0.5
constant -1.14 -1.23 -1.36 -1.68 -1.81 
log U-1 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.42 0.53 
log V
-1 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.57 0.47 
CRS rate 74% 74% 75% 74% 74% 
σ = 1
constant -1.70 -1.76 -1.87 -2.07 -2.13 
log U-1 0.19 0.22 0.26 0.42 0.53 
log V
-1 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.58 0.47 
CRS rate 77% 76% 76% 79% 76% 
Notes:  Coefficients are means over 1,000 simulations. CRS rate reports in how many percent the constant returns 
to scale assumption could not be rejected. 
4.F Contact Rate
The household panel study “The Labor Market and Social Security” (Panel 
Arbeitsmarkt und soziale Sicherung, PASS) conducted by the IAB is designed to 
evaluate the Hartz reforms, but it also allows to address broader questions on 
unemployment and poverty in Germany. Therefore, PASS draws a sample of 
unemployment benefit II recipients as well as a sample of the general population. 
The survey started in 2006/2007 (inquiry period from December to July) with around 
12,000 households and is repeated annually. The response rate of the first wave 
was 27%. See Trappmann et al. (2010) for more information on the survey design.
23 We assume 60% exogenous quits and 40% endogenous firing. This assumption is without consequence for our 
matching function results but ensures that the separation rate is not unrealistically volatile.
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The main advantage compared to administrative data is that PASS collects 
information on job search activities of unemployed workers. The questions include 
a general statement on whether a person looks for a job or not as well as details 
on own search activities, such as sending unsolicited applications or placing job 
advertisements. Moreover, the survey contains information on job interviews within 
the last four weeks. This information enables us to compute an aggregate contact 
rate of unemployed workers. 
Figure 4.F.1 shows different definitions of the contact rate over the available 
waves. Roughly speaking, the contact rate increases from 25% to 35%. The slight 
upward trend might indicate an increased pressure on unemployed workers to look 
for a job, which is likely to result from tightened sanction schemes. The contact 
rate conditional on own search activities is steadily higher than the contact rate 
conditional on general job search or than the unconditional contact rate. Obviously, 
the higher the search intensity of an unemployed worker, the more likely he or she 
gets a job interview. However, the deviations of the different definitions are quite 
low and one can conclude an aggregate contact rate of approximately 30%.
Figure 4.F.1: Contact rates
Notes:  Shares of unemployed workers with at least one job interview in the last four weeks. Denominators: All 
unemployed workers who are asked about interviews (solid line), who state to search for a job (dashed 
line) and who declare to undertake own search activities (dotted line). Sampling weights are considered.
1 2 3
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.50
.45
.40
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5 Conclusion
This dissertation has presented three essays on the cyclicality of worker flows. 
The transitions in the labor market are substantial components of modern labor 
market theory. They play a crucial role for macroeconomic outcomes and policy 
implications. Therefore, a clear understanding of their cyclical behavior appears to 
be indispensable.
In the first essay, I have analyzed the effects of time aggregation in the 
measurement of worker flows. Therefore, I have exploited daily information 
from German administrative data and derived a monthly measure of the time 
aggregation bias in the job finding and separation rates. The monthly bias accounts 
for a considerable fraction of worker flows, but it does not indicate a procyclical 
behavior in the separation rate as recently stated in the literature. I have argued 
that this observation may reveal some facts about job-to-job transitions. The 
reconsideration of the job finding and separation rates shows a conventional 
behavior on business cycle frequency, where the job finding rate has turned out to 
play a dominant role in explaining unemployment fluctuations.
In the second essay, I have studied the cyclical behavior of unemployment 
dynamics in more detail. Therefore, I have employed a SVAR model and explored 
the worker reallocation process in response to a set of economically well-founded 
shocks. The adjustment process of unemployment indeed varies with the identified 
innovations. Further, the differences in the prevalent transmission channel can be 
related to differences in the persistence of shocks. Accordingly, the more persistent 
shocks are, the more likely is an unemployment adjustment along the job finding 
margin. Productivity shocks contribute relatively strong to variations in the 
transition rates; however, their importance shrinks after the German reunification 
in favor of fiscal policy shocks.
In the third essay, I have examined the empirical evidence of a Cobb-Douglas 
matching function. Thereby, I have updated previous matching function estimations 
by using consistent measures of stock and flow variables. The results provide strong 
evidence in favor of the standard constant returns to scale assumption. Turning 
to restricted matching elasticities, I have extended the baseline specification by 
several control variables that refer to the underlying unemployment pool. The 
control variables are important to eliminate the autocorrelation issue in the error 
term and strengthen the role of vacancies in explaining the aggregate job finding 
rate. However, the empirical evidence can be replicated by a labor selection model 
that obviates a matching function. In particular, the model does not contain a 
direct link between the job finding rate and vacancies, which implies a cautionary 
note on interpreting the aggregate matching function. 
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Conclusion
To sum up, the contributions of this dissertation reinforce a more precise 
consideration of worker flows in the search and matching model. This concerns, 
in particular, the cyclical behavior of the separation rate, the different effects 
of aggregate shocks and the interpretation of the matching function. Although 
the literature provides a lot of promising extensions of the standard model, their 
convenience is typically confronted with several criteria, such as the replication 
of stylized facts. For example, the endogenization of the separation rate is often 
prejudged to fail the relationship of the Beveridge curve. Therefore, further insight 
from the micro level seems to be necessary to overcome those drawbacks.
Throughout my dissertation, I have emphasized the usefulness of administrative 
micro data. The high-frequency information of German labor market processes has 
enabled me to compute a monthly time aggregation bias and to capture additional 
unemployment dynamics one would neglect by applying survey data. However, the 
contributions of this dissertation have also indicated some limitations of process-
generated data. For example, the administrative database is silent about individual 
attitudes concerning the take-up of unemployment benefits. The same holds for the 
incentives of firms to report their vacancies to an employment agency. Therefore, 
I have complemented the estimation of the matching function with survey 
information on job vacancies. In addition, I have used a household survey to shed 
light on the probability of job interviews. Accordingly, the merging of administrative 
and survey data may be a promising step to address a lot of additional questions.
Moreover, the essays of this dissertation suggest a number of interesting issues 
for future research. First, the investigation of the time aggregation bias raises the 
hypothesis of a cyclicality in the take-up of unemployment benefits. If the take-up 
of unemployment benefits and thus the registration of job seekers at an employment 
agency depends on the expected unemployment duration, this may have important 
implications for the public placement service. Second, the conditional patterns 
of unemployment dynamics point to fiscal interventions as a promising tool for 
controlling labor market fluctuations. An investigation of specific fiscal stimuli, 
as used in course of the financial crisis, is likely to provide more insight into the 
functioning of the labor market. In addition, Germany has a large export sector and 
an analysis of trade shocks may help to explain the large volatilities in the labor 
market. Finally, the analysis of the matching function gives rise to further research 
on the worker selection process. Empirical evidence on training costs of newly hired 
workers would not only help to verify the selection model, but it would also help 
to shed light on the quality of job matches. In this context, the impact of the Hartz 
reforms and their long-run effects are still an open question. Hence, the German 
labor market will continue to be an interesting example to address ongoing debates 
on worker flows.
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Abstract
The development of unemployment and employment is strongly determined by 
labor market flows. This dissertation analyzes worker flows, i.e. job findings and 
separations, over the business cycle. The analysis uses process-generated micro 
data provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), which allow gaining 
comprehensive insights into labor market dynamics in Germany.
The first essay investigates the effects of time aggregation, which is of particular 
importance in the context of flow data. If labor market states are measured on larger 
intervals, it is likely to neglect transitions that are reversed within two measurement 
points. The daily data base for Germany allows quantifying this bias by comparing 
labor market transitions that are calculated on different frequencies. The main 
result is that a monthly measurement of labor market states underestimates total 
worker flows by 10%. In contrast, a theoretical correction approach implies an 
underestimation of only 3%. The time aggregation bias in the job finding rate 
shows a procyclical behavior, while the time aggregation bias in the separation rate 
appears to be relatively unaffected by the economic situation.
The second essay studies German worker flows in response to structural 
shocks. The results show various patterns of how the labor market adjusts to 
the steady state. In particular, the transmission channel varies with the different 
impulses. After a technology shock, unemployment adjusts gradually via the job 
finding margin. A monetary policy shock triggers a hump-shaped reaction, which 
is also determined by the job finding rate. In contrast, a fiscal policy shock leads 
to a short-lived variation in unemployment, where the separation rate plays a 
larger role.
The third essay deals with the modeling of the job finding margin. Job findings 
are typically represented by a matching function, where the number of matches 
depends on the stocks of unemployment and vacancies. There is evidence that this 
approach is empirically relevant – both in standard form and in extended form. The 
estimation results are then replicated by simulations of a theoretical model, which 
describes a firm’s hiring process. This model implies an alternative interpretation 
of the matching function because it assumes that vacancies merely appear as 
a worker attraction device, while the number of matches is determined by the 
idiosyncratic productivity of the applicants.
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Kurzfassung
Die Entwicklung von Arbeitslosigkeit und Beschäftigung wird maßgeblich von 
den Übergängen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt beeinflusst. Die vorliegende Disserta-
tion analysiert die Übergänge von Arbeitskräften, also Einstellungen und Ent-
lassungen, im konjunkturellen Zusammenhang. Dabei werden prozessgenerierte 
Personen daten des Instituts für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB) ver-
wendet, welche einen umfassenden Einblick in die Dynamik am deutschen Ar-
beitsmarkt ermöglichen.
Die erste Studie beschäftigt sich mit den Effekten der Zeitaggregation, die 
bei Stromgrößen von besonderer Bedeutung sind. Sind die Erwerbszustände von 
Personen nur über größere Zeitabstände beobachtbar, so werden möglicherwei-
se Übergänge vernachlässigt, die zwischen zwei Beobachtungszeitpunkten wieder 
rückgängig gemacht werden. Die tagesgenaue Datenbasis für Deutschland ermög-
licht eine Quantifizierung dieser Verzerrung, indem die Arbeitsmarktübergänge 
auf unterschiedlichen Frequenzen ausgewertet werden. Das zentrale Ergebnis ist, 
dass die Übergänge am deutschen Arbeitsmarkt durch eine monatliche Messung 
der Erwerbszustände um 10% unterschätzt werden. Ein theoretischer Korrektur-
ansatz impliziert dagegen nur eine Unterschätzung von 3%. Weiterhin weist die 
Verzerrung in der Einstellungsrate ein pro zyklisches Verhalten auf, während die 
Verzerrung in der Entlassungsrate nahezu unabhängig von der wirtschaftlichen 
Entwicklung ist.
Die zweite Studie untersucht die Übergänge am deutschen Arbeitsmarkt in Ab-
hängigkeit von strukturellen Schocks. Hierbei ergeben sich ganz unterschiedliche 
Muster, wie sich der Arbeitsmarkt zurück zum Gleichgewicht bewegt. Insbesondere 
variiert der Transmissionskanal mit den verschiedenen konjunkturellen Impulsen. 
So ist nach einem Technologieschock eine sukzessive Anpassung der Arbeitslosig-
keit zu beobachten, die primär von Schwankungen in der Einstellungsrate bestimmt 
wird. Nach einem geldpolitischen Impuls zeigt sich eine buckelförmige Reaktion, 
die ebenfalls von der Einstellungsrate determiniert wird. Ein fiskalpolitischer Impuls 
bewirkt hingegen eine kurzfristige Veränderung in der Arbeitslosigkeit, wobei die 
Entlassungsrate eine größere Rolle spielt.
Die dritte Studie befasst sich mit der Modellierung von Einstellungen. Typi-
scherweise werden Einstellungen mithilfe einer Matchingfunktion dargestellt, wel-
che die Zahl der Einstellungen in Abhängigkeit der Bestände von Arbeitslosigkeit 
und offenen Stellen bestimmt. Es wird gezeigt, dass dieser Ansatz empirisch rele-
vant ist – sowohl in der Standard-Form als auch in erweiterter Form. Die Schätz-
ergebnisse werden anschließend durch Simulationen eines theo retischen Modells 
zum betrieblichen Such- und Einstellungsprozess repliziert. Dieses Modell geht mit 
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einer alternativen Interpretation der Matchingfunktion einher, denn es wird ange-
nommen, dass Stellenausschreibungen lediglich eine Signalfunktion für Bewerber 
aufweisen, während die Zahl der Einstellungen von der individuellen Produktivität 
der Bewerber abhängt.
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Der Beschäftigungs-
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Empirische Analyse der
Problemlage von Langzeit-
arbeitslosen
Die Studie beleuchtet die Problemlagen
von Langzeitarbeitslosen und zeigt auf, in
wie weit der Beschäftigungszuschuss, 
der 2011 abgeschafft wurde, zur Lösung
beitragen kann. 
Sie analysiert den Stellenwert von
Erwerbsarbeit für die Betroffenen und die
Hindernisse, die einer Integration in
Erwerbsarbeit entgegenstehen. 
Die Arbeit von Philipp Fuchs stützt sich
sowohl auf quantitative Analysen der
Erwerbsverläufe als auch auf biografische
Interviews mit den Geförderten.
